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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THESIS STATEMENT 
This thesis contributes to ongoing research concerning the project 
CyberCIEGE, conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School. “The purpose of the 
CyberCIEGE project is to create an Information Assurance (IA) teaching/learning 
laboratory.”[Irvine1 2003]  
The focus of this research is the development of a CyberCIEGE Scenario 
Definition File (SDF) intended to simultaneously educate users about security matters 
concerning integrity issues and to entertain them. Additionally this research develops a 
test plan to evaluate whether the CyberCIEGE game engine performs as expected 
when provided with a user-defined SDF, i.e. producing results within an expected 
range. 
The goal of the thesis is to answer two questions. First, can a scenario be 
developed, such that it is simultaneously a playable game and educational tool, while 
illustrating integrity issues in a military-like networked environment? Second, is it 
possible to validate that the CyberCIEGE game engine produces expected results from 
a specific scenario definition file? 
 
B. THESIS SCOPE & LAYOUT 
The scope of the thesis is to create a SDF for the CyberCIEGE game that 
educates and trains players in Information Assurance on matters related to a 
networking environment. The specific area of research is the protection of a network 
environment with respect to integrity. The primary concern is the protection of stored 
data that forms part of the player’s assets, e.g., a database containing weapon 
information, with the effect, that failure to preserve its integrity might result in 
engaging a false target. Taking into account the nondeterministic nature of the game 
engine, the scenario definition file and variations of it, representing legitimate and 
likely user choices, are used to test, whether the game engine, given these inputs, 
performs in a manner consistent with the expected results of the specified SDF. The 
2 
impact of this research could have benefits for future DOD training and education 
requirements in the Information Assurance / Network Security area. 
The thesis comprises following chapters: 
• Chapter I – Introduction – This chapter provides the thesis statement 
and describes the scope to the thesis. It gives an overview over the 
chapters, figures and annexes of the paper. 
• Chapter II - Background – This chapter describes the project and its 
background and illustrates the contribution of this thesis to the overall 
project. It describes some of the key concepts this paper focuses on. 
• Chapter III – Educational Goals – This chapter analyses the game’s 
target group and introduces the reader into the specific educational 
goals of the SDF created with this thesis.  
• Chapter IV – Scenario Description – This chapter introduces the reader 
to the player’s virtual world as modeled by the SDF. It includes a 
narrative description, the briefing to the player, a description of the 
users, policies, assets, components, and potential attacks, modeled by 
the SDF. 
• Chapter V - Testing – This chapter describes the test strategy and 
important test cases indicating the scope, the expected and actual 
results. 
• Chapter VI - Future Work & Conclusion Conclusion – This chapter 
looks at areas of potential further research, and gives a brief summary 
of the work accomplished by this thesis. 
 
C. APPENDIX OVERVIEW 
The following appendices complete this thesis: 
• Appendix A - Scenario Definition Files (SDF). This appendix includes 
the SDF’s of the main test cases described in this paper, and the 
playable SDFs. For the playable SDFs it includes a version of game 
play with possible player choices that lead to winning the game, and a 
second version of game play with bad player choices that lead to losing 
the game. 
• Appendix B – Workspace Files. This appendix includes the workspace 
files used for the scenarios. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter describes briefly the motivation for the CyberCIEGE game, the 
current unsatisfactory situation concerning computer security1 training and how this 
game contributes to improving the latter. The interested reader is encouraged to look at 
[Irvine1 2003] and [Johns 2004] for an in depth description of the game. The chapter 
depicts the contribution of this thesis to the overall goal of the CyberCIEGE project 
and provides a brief elaboration on those key concepts of computer security, the thesis 
focuses on. 
 
A. CURRENT SITUATION IN COMPUTER SECURITY TRAINING 
Within the last few years, the number of computer users increased 
continuously. Substantial progress in computer technology has made computers and 
network equipment available to a variety of users with different backgrounds and 
objectives. According to a survey by Jupitermedia corporation [Nua Internet Surveys 
2004], the number of Internet users around the globe grew from 66.68 million, 1.61% 
of the population, in March 1998 to 580.78 million, 9.57% of the population, in May 
2002. The number of Internet users in the US grew from 123.6 million, 45.33% of the 
US population in February 2000, to 165.75 million, 59.1% of the population in April 
2002; a growth of around 7% per year. Computers are being used in various fields, 
ranging from simple text processing at home or at work, to e-commerce, Internet 
banking, and storage of customer or other sensitive information in databases accessed 
over networks, to complex data processing in technical and military environments. 
With the increasing number of users, however, attacks on assets stored on 
computer devices or on the efficient use of IT equipment (i.e. by Denial of Service 
[DOS] attacks) have also increased. Hatcher [Hatcher 2001] reports that the combined 
deficit due to computer security breaches in 2000, amongst 249 US companies and 
agencies was about $265 million. In 2001, the deficit of 186 entities was nearly $378 
 
1 “Broadly speaking, security is keeping anyone from doing things you do not want them to do to, 
with, or from your computers or any peripherals.”-William R. Cheswick, [March 31, 2004, from NCSA 
website: http://archive.ncsa.uiuc.edu/General/CC/ACES/workshop/tsld003.htm 
4 
million. This data indicates that more users rely on computers to store, or process 
assets of increasingly higher values. Therefore, computer security breaches cause 
increasingly greater deficits. 
Due to frequent media coverage, the awareness of computer security threats, as 
well as countermeasures against attacks, have also tremendously increased. Many 
suppliers of web-based email are applying spam filters and virus scans automatically, 
and allow for user tuning. They are also providing virus alerts and supplemental 
information – i.e. SSL connections and child protection features [WEB.DE 2004]. 
Many other vendors provide low priced or even free anti-virus or firewall software. 
However, this increase has not translated into a significant change in user behavior. 
Users continue to use trivial passwords, fail to download security patches, or to use, 
and update anti-virus software. “Further still, corporate and government policy makers 
often elect to deploy weak protection mechanisms in environments subject to 
potentially highly motivated hostile attacks.” [Irvine1 2003]  
Irvine [Irvine1 2003] and Johns [Johns 2004] deduce that the discrepancy 
between awareness and knowledge of computer security, and the failure to readily, 
continuously, and correctly apply computer security principles and measures in the 
real world, i.e. in every day life, is mainly affected by the type of computer security 
training available. The latter is described as often being “mundane and boring, for both 
users and administrators.” [Irvine1 2003] Having taken IT security classes and 
introduced new crewmembers to the ship’s security policy and measures as the 
responsible IT Security Officer, the author can confirm this perception.  
The basic problem of any instruction or presentation is a human’s limitation in 
assimilating and memorizing a large amount of facts. Furthermore, many companies, 
but especially the military, have a high frequency of rotating people on a job. Thus, 
employees and soldiers are exposed to several differing and boring briefings. Each 
system is different; every department may have individual needs and possibly faces 
different threats. To meet the specific goals, policies and security measures are tailored 
to the needs of a ship, a department or an individual system. Thus, changing to a new 
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ship, department or system, requires new, potentially boring, computer security 
training.  
In addition to “knowledge of the requisite facts”, some forms of engineering 
also require “a tacit understanding of the art of (…) engineering.” [Irvine1 2003] To 
make learning more interesting and more effective, i.e. to generate longer lasting 
knowledge, personal, “hands-on” experience may be necessary. “Sometimes people 
have to experience a problem in order to understand it.” [Irvine1 2003] In some areas 
military uses simulators to expose soldiers to above effects and to help them develop a 
tacit understanding. Both, military and commercial companies are recognizing tacit 
knowledge as a vital company asset and are searching for tools to measure and transfer 
it. [Richter 2003] 
Despite an increase in computer security awareness, many users and policy 
makers still do not implement security principles in their daily life. Mundane and 
boring education and the lack of personal experience and tacit understanding might be 
a main cause. 
What if education could be made more interesting, more hands–on? 
 
B. A GAME TO TEACH COMPUTER SECURITY 
A commercial-quality game for teaching computer security concepts could be 
used for both: to convey requisite facts and to generate tacit understanding of general 
concepts of computer security to a broad audience. [Irvine 2003] 
Game play per se is interesting, as it stimulates a human’s natural behavior, his 
eagerness to explore. It therefore has the psychological advantage of guiding a student 
into a more open-minded state, compared to a potentially boring brief or classical 
classroom education. 
Analogous to a simulator, a game creates a concealed virtual environment that 
allows the player to experiment and to test old and new ideas, without the risk of 
violating laws, or harming a real system, or in the case of computer security, without 
actually changing security settings and exposing the system to real threats. 
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A simulation or a game therefore has the potential to being both, time and cost 
efficient. 
The CyberCIEGE game offers all these benefits.  
The game will simulate a range of scenarios involving computer 
networks. (…) The player will make security-relevant decisions about 
the network components and their interconnections. The player will 
also make decisions that affect the behavior of a set of virtual ‘user’ 
characters that perform other roles within the enterprise and must 
efficiently perform work for the player to succeed the game. [Irvine1 
2003]  
CyberCIEGE can be shipped with a set of starter scenarios [Johns 2004], but 
also offers the possibility for customers to write their own Scenario Definition File 
(SDF), tailoring the game to their specific needs. Thus, a teacher can emphasize 
special computer security topics and a company can train its employees for their 
particular IT environment. CyberCIEGE is able to serve a variety of customers: 
managers, administrators, teachers, students and regular computer users, in both, the 
military and the commercial world. It is extensible, to allow for the simulation of new 
threats and countermeasures, and it offers logging tools to aid instructors to review and 
analyze special situations, and evaluate student decisions. 
The CyberCIEGE game offers an easily deployable and cost efficient tool, to 
teach about key concepts of computer security, while being interesting to play. 
 
C. INTEGRITY IN A MILITARY LIKE FACILITY 
Following statements taken from the webpage of different news agencies prove 
the increasing use of computer technology in military environments and also show 
security concerns and problems due to a lack of applying sound computer security 
principles. ‘abcNEWS.com’ posted following statement on their webpage: 
Tens of thousands of U.S. military and government computers 
containing sensitive information are easily accessible over the Internet, 
a computer security firm that cracked the networks said today. (…) 
Military encryption techniques, correspondence between generals, 
recruits' Social Security and credit-card numbers and other sensitive 
information is often stored on Internet-connected computers that use 
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easily guessed passwords or in some cases no passwords at all, said an 
official at San Diego security firm ForensicTec Solutions Inc. [Sullivan 
2002] 
ISN posted following quote of WASHINGTON (AP) [3.22.99] on their 
webpage:  
The Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 
systems, known as C4I, is compromised by security problems and also 
by a military culture prone to treating such problems as a lesser priority, 
the National Research Council reported. [WASHINGTON (AP) [1999] 
Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minihan is quoted concerning attacks on military computers 
by ‘wired news’: 
Last year, over 250 unclassified DOD computer systems were known to 
have been penetrated. (…) The number of attacks are escalating; will 
double this year. [Minihan 1997] 
Disregarding the use of simple office applications that are indispensable in any 
company, DOD and many branches of the military cumulatively use computers in 
sensitive areas, performing increasingly complex tasks. Today, most computers are at 
least connected to an Intranet. They are utilized for data acquisition, data storage, and 
data analysis and in many areas of the C4I structure. Marines use computers in land 
combat, they are contained in armored vehicles, serve as navigation and C4I 
equipment (i.e. TACOM). The Air Force has surveillance and communication 
networks, and today no modern aircraft would fly without the complex on-board 
computer systems. The Navy uses computers for similar purposes in ashore facilities, 
but also on ships, to enhance efficiency of their sensors and weapon systems. 
The German Navy recently commissioned a new type of Frigate: type ship 
F124 “Sachsen”. In terms of technology, this is one of the most modern battleships. 
The ship has a modular structure, modern sensors and effectors and it uses a digital 
network, the “databus-based integrated monitoring and control system (IMCS) – 
monitoring and controlling all technical systems and plants on board.” [Blohm + Voss 
2004]. (Figure 1 illustrates the complexity of the ICMS) The ICMS also provides 
several operating aids, fully automatic damage analysis and substantial simulation 
capabilities. “All conceivable operating and damage scenarios can be simulated for 
crew training purposes.” [Blohm + Voss 2004] 
 
 
Figure 1.   Integrated Monitoring and Control System [From Blohm + Voss 2004] 
 
The most interesting innovation from a computer security standpoint, however, is “the 
decentralized combat direction system with the operational CDS [Combat Direction 
System] software, [where] computer capacity is distributed among 17 computers 
linked with a multiple-redundant ATM bus.” [Blohm + Voss 2004] Sensors and 
effectors are connected, analyzed and controlled by the system. The balance between 
operational ease and security measures in such and environment seems to be a 
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Figure 2.   Combat System [From Blohm + Voss 2004] 
 
It is evident, that ensuring computer security on such systems will be a major 
challenge for all groups, designers, managers and users, faced with the task to balance 
the needs for user convenience and operational needs on the one hand, and securing 
the systems, i.e. enforcing constraints imposed by computer security, on the other. 
What if an attacker succeeded in planting a trap door in the database software storing 
target information for missiles? 
Motivated by the author’s background as a Naval Officer, this paper 
concentrates on a scenario that creates a virtual world influenced by, and similar to a 
ship’s Combat Information Center (CIC). The setting is a modern battleship with the 
need for high automation, thus sufficient computers and networks. The ship gains or 
loses money, depending on its ability to perform certain tasks. The player assumes the 
9 
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role of the IT Officer, who has to provide components  (workstations, servers, etc.) for 
his crew members, the users, and design a network to support the operational needs of 
the crew and their ship. The major challenge is a proper balance between user 
convenience and computer security measures that allows the player to implement and 
test his ideas about the best choice for the design of such a network, without actually 
setting it at risk. However, the scenario does not provide a detailed simulation of the 
shipboard environment. Instead, it is only a means of highlighting important computer 
security issues and raising their awareness. 
Focusing on integrity of primarily data in storage, a computer security 
component that has become increasingly important in the military world [Ferraiolo 
1992] [Clark 1987], this thesis contributes to the overall goal of the CyberCIEGE 
project, to teach users about different aspects of computer security, with a tool that is 
both, fun and educational at the same time.  
 
D. KEY CONCEPTS 
For readers with no or only minor computer security background, to better 
understand the topics addressed in this thesis and the implications of educational goals 
and test cases, this section describes some of the underlying key concepts used in this 
paper. The set presented here is, however, not intended to be complete for either the 
CyberCIEGE game engine, nor for the scenario developed by this thesis. 
1. Computer Security 
The notion of computer security is the basic concept the IT Officer on a highly 
computerized ship, such as that described above, has to understand, in order to identify 
the type, and importance of the ships assets, to correctly assess the threat posed to 
those assets, and to analyze the security measures, to ensure their protection. 
Computer security, however, is a broad term, composed of other key concepts. 
The National Information Assurance Glossary [CNSS No. 4009] defines computer 
security as: 
Measures and controls that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of IS [Information Systems] assets including hardware, 
software, firmware, and information being processed, stored, and 
communicated.  
According to Brinkley and Schell “there are many characterizations of 
computer security.” [Brinkley 1995] The definition used in this paper relates to 
information technology security as defined by the European Community, and cited in 
[Brinkley 1995]. Computer security is composed of three properties: 
Confidentiality:  Prevention of unauthorized disclosure of 
information. 
Integrity: Prevention of unauthorized modification of information. 
Availability:  Prevention of unauthorized withholding of information 
or resources.  
The distinction between computer security and information assurance is, that 
the latter incorporates the notion of authenticity2 and non-repudiation3 in addition to 




















Figure 3.   Computer Security Versus Information Assurance [After Usher 2003] 
 
The CyberCIEGE game addresses all properties of computer security. Several 
scenarios are being developed with various levels of complexity and with different 
objectives. Some of the scenarios focus on only some properties, e.g. only on physical 
security, or mainly on confidentiality. The combination of diverse scenarios 
                                                 
2 Authenticity is the notion of assuring that the sender of information, i.e. a message, is indeed its 
originator. 
3 The sender and recipient are provided with proof of the transaction, so none can deny to be part of 
it. [CNSS No. 4009] 
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contributes to the overall goal of the game. This thesis concentrates on the aspects of 
integrity to a military-like facility.  
2. Confidentiality 
When speaking of security of military data, most people automatically think of 
the challenge to prevent sensitive data from being disclosed to unauthorized personnel, 
be it the adversary or the media. Including the notion of electronic data processing, 
‘unauthorized personnel’ is expanded to ‘unauthorized processes, or devices’. [CNSS 
No. 4009] [Clark 1987] 
A battleship has to handle several types of sensitive information on various 
classification levels. Although most messages are at lower levels of classification, 
there are, however, several confidential, and some secret or even top-secret ones. 
Information concerning force disposition, weapon or sensor parameters and profiles, 
and communication codes, all need to be thoroughly protected against disclosure. The 
scenario generated by this thesis addresses some aspects of confidentiality and 
provides assets of different security clearance levels. However, most of the direct users 
within the simulated world are cleared at a level equal to that for authorized reading of 
all information4. Scenarios developed by other students address confidentiality more 
closely. 
3. Integrity 
Although Clark [Clark 1987] and Ferraiolo [Ferraiolo 1992] state, that the 
military is mainly concerned with protecting the confidentiality of information, and 
that it is mostly the commercial world which has to deal with integrity, they conclude, 
“Indeed, much data processing within the military exactly matches commercial 
practices.” However, they still note a “difference in priority.”  
Considering the fact, that the military increasingly deploys systems depending 
on computers mostly connected to networks, a significant increase in the military’s 
interest in the integrity aspect of computer security can be noted. What if the software 
controlling the reactors of nuclear submarines or aircraft carriers contained malicious 
code or flaws? What if the targeting data was modified while entered into a missile’s 
 
4 There are some indirect users, e.g. the Internet, who lack adequate clearance. 
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navigation system? What if an attacker could modify the entries in the weapons or 
electronic warfare database of a battleship?  
Reportedly, US Intelligence was able to insert a Trojan Horse into the 
software, acquired by the K.G.B. to control critical components of a gas pipeline. The 
Trojan Horse was preset to cause a system malfunction. “The result was the most 
monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space.” The explosion 
occurred in June 1982. [Safire 2004] The resulting loss of the Soviet Union’s trust in 
western software is since known as ‘The American Software Problem’. [Irvine4 2004] 
Ken Thompson described a trap door in an early version of an UNIX compiler, 
introducing a copy of itself into any software that it compiled. [Irvine 2 2002] 
There are many questions regarding the assurance of systems: 
How much commercial off-the-shelf software is used in military applications? 
Might a terrorist group be able to insert a trap door in software that is a part of a 
critical military system? What about possible mistakes a cleared user makes, while 
handling sensitive data? What about regular flaws experienced by nearly any computer 
user on a regular basis? 
This thesis focuses on the integrity aspect of computer security. The National 
Information Assurance Glossary [CNSS No. 4009] defines integrity as: 
The quality of an IS [Information System] reflecting the logical 
correctness and reliability of the operating system; the logical 
completeness of the hardware and software implementing the 
protection mechanisms; and the consistency of the data structures and 
occurrence of the stored data. Note that, in a formal security mode, 
integrity is interpreted more narrowly to mean protection against 
unauthorized modification or destruction of information.  
Sandu and Jajodia [Sandu 1995] suggest using the term “improper” instead of 
“unauthorized”, since modification can happen even without authorization violation. 
An authorized user can modify information as a mistake or deliberately, if he responds 
to social engineering. 
Irvine [Irvine2 2002] distinguishes between integrity of data in storage and that 
in transmission. Integrity of data in storage can further be subdivided into integrity of 
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data, and integrity of source code. The latter has different implications, whether it is 
used on a component or a system. Being on a system, its integrity level defines the 
maximum integrity capacity of the system. 
A modern battleship is equipped with several systems that are exchanging 
sensitive information with other ships of the force and the head quarters, e.g. 
information about the weapon status or force disposition. Integrity of the data while in 
transmission is mostly preserved using secure lines, i.e. encryption devices. However, 
if the ship uses an internal network, data integrity might be prone to attacks, if the 
network spans zones of different protection and classification levels. A malicious 
crewmember might be able to wiretap the less protected line. 
Considering that a battleship needs to handle several databases containing 
sensitive information, e.g., a database with weapon parameters or electronic signatures 
of hostile missiles, or a database containing personal and medical information of 
crewmembers, integrity implications of data in storage are of high importance. IT 
personnel need to carefully consider where to store the data, how to secure it, and who 
to grant access to the components holding the asset. To make the data available to 
subsystems and users, careful analysis of the environment, attached components or 
networks, is required to balance the need for fast and easy access, yet sufficient 
protection of the data integrity. For example, how would the reaction window of the 
ship in applying countermeasures against an incoming missile, flying at supersonic 
speed, be affected, if the electronic signatures were stored on a stand-alone 
component? On the other hand, consider the vulnerabilities that result by connecting 
the database to the network, which is used to grant access to off-the-shelf office 
applications, or even worse, the same network that allows navigational personnel to 
access the Internet to retrieve current weather updates. This latter choice of 
architecture would expose the data to low integrity software, potentially containing 
trap doors or even to hacking attempts over the Internet. 
The ability to protect the integrity of sensitive data in such a scenario depends 
on the right choice of the integrity of software used to store and operate on the data, 
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and a proper evaluation of the integrity capacity of the component to store the high 
integrity assets, and the network used to facilitate access these assets. 
4. Availability 
An important aspect of military security measures is to ensure that all vital 
systems are fully operational when they are needed. Some need to be running 24 hours 
a day, seven days a week, while at sea. Ensuring uninterrupted use of its systems, i.e. 
protecting against Denial Of Service (DOS) attacks, is vital for most military systems. 
On ships, navigation and propulsion systems are vital for safe maneuvering. An engine 
breakdown or the inability to correctly determine its position while e.g. passing tight 
waters or a cleared mine channel might result in a collision or explosion, endangering 
the lives of hundreds of sailors. Were attackers able to initiate a system crash of the 
Combat Direction System (CDS) of, for example, the F124, during an engagement, 
while under aircraft or missile attack, the ship would be defenseless. 
5. Assurance and Software Integrity 
In the context of computer security, assurance is the level of confidence that 
the security features, architecture and procedures of a computer system correctly 
enforce the security policy. [CNSS No. 4009] It is the trust in the software engineers, 
programmers, and the development process, to ensure that the software fully meets its 
requirements, and has no flaws, no trap doors and no additional functionality, and no 
harmless or malicious Easter eggs. The ability to demonstrate these properties is 
provided by evaluation assurance levels (EAL) from the Common Criteria (CC) 
nomenclature.[CC 2004] The CC provides detailed guidelines on tools and techniques 
to be applied by developers and evaluators. To demonstrate that, for example, a 
security kernel5 (SK) is free of malicious code, the tools and techniques requested for 
an assurance level of EAL 7 have to be applied. 
However, these tools and techniques do not apply to other arbitrary software, 
including applications, and general-purpose operating systems (OS). This is mainly, 
because most applications and operating systems are much too complex to be 
analyzable. Therefore, these applications and OSes cannot be evaluated at high 
assurance levels, i.e., not at EAL 6 and EAL 7. 
 
5 See paragraph II.C.6 for a definition. 
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The CyberCIEGE game engine uses a value to represent the strength of 
applications and operating systems. OSes that have been evaluated to enforce a policy 
with high assurance are given high values. Additionally, applications and OS that have 
been developed in a closed environment, receive a high value.  
To address the strength of software that does not enforce a security policy, this 
paper uses the notion of software integrity. High integrity software has a high strength 
value. With an increase in value, the likelihood that software contains a trap door or a 
Trojan Horse decreases. 
When assessing the likelihood of attacks on the integrity of an asset, the game 
engine picks the lowest strength value of the OS and all the applications of the 
component that have access to the asset.  
In the case of operating systems with a MAC enforcement mechanism of high 
assurance, the OS has a high strength value. This high value has two effects: 
1. It indicates that the OS is less likely to contain malicious code, which 
directly affects the integrity of the data. The likelihood of data modification 
decreases with an increasing strength value. 
2. The OS is able to enforce a policy to protect the integrity of the data, even 
in the presence of low integrity data or low integrity software on the same 
component. 
The integrity and the assurance of software, applications and OSes, is reflected 
in the description provided inside the encyclopedia of the CyberCIEGE game. The 
assurance is indicated using an EAL from the CC nomenclature. The integrity of 
software is indicated by descriptive text. Very high integrity software is described as 
having been produced in a closed environment. Software of low and moderate 
integrity is described in terms of thoroughness and amount of testing, and in some 
cases, by evaluations at low and moderate EAL. 
The tuning of the game engine offers the opportunity to distinguish between 
very high integrity software, and other software. The tuning, however, does not 
provide the means to distinguish between moderate and low integrity software. 
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The level of confidence in the software and the OS used on a system clearly 
will influence its integrity capacity. [Irvine2 2002] Thus, if the IT Officer of a 
battleship chooses to run both high and low integrity software on a system that has no 
security kernel the maximum integrity capacity of the system will be bounded by the 
capacity of the component with the lowest confidence: the low integrity software, if 
the OS is of higher integrity, or the OS, if it is of lower integrity. This statement holds, 
regardless of which software is dedicated to process the data. It is expected that there 
is a high probability for low integrity software to contain malicious code. Therefore, if 
the IT Officer chooses the low integrity software to process the data, the malicious 
code inside the software will have direct access to the data and will modify it. If the 
high integrity software is chosen to process the data, the malicious code inside the low 
integrity software will still be able to access and modify the data in the absence of a 
SK, even if it is not dedicated to operate on the data. If the OS is the lowest integrity 
component, malicious code within the OS will also have direct access to the data. 
Therefore the IT Officer might not be able to preserve the integrity of high integrity 
assets on such a system.  
6. Reference Monitor / Security Kernel 
The development of the Reference Monitor (RM) concept was, according to 
[Schell 1995], primarily motivated to counter the threat posed by the potential 
presence of malicious software.  
A Reference Monitor ‘enforces the authorized access relationships 
between subjects and objects of a system.’ [Irvine3 2004] 
The RM needs to be: 
a. Tamperproof, 
b. Always invoked, 
c. Analyzable. 
An implementation of the RM concept is a security kernel (SK). 
Using a SK would allow an IT Officer to compose a multilevel system, i.e. a 
system allowing access to personnel of different clearance levels and allowing storage 
and processing of data of different classification levels. Such a system would also 
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allow the IT Officer to install applications of different integrity levels on the same 
system. Properly configured, the SK would grant the high integrity application, which 
is dedicated to modification of the high integrity asset, access to the asset, while 
denying access by other applications, i.e. low integrity software dedicated to other 
purposes or possibly a Trojan Horse within that software. 
7. Closed Environment 
In the Glossary of Computer Security Terms, the National Computer Security 
Center defines the term ‘closed environment’ as follows: 
An environment in which both of the following conditions hold true:  
(1) Application developers (…) have sufficient clearances and 
authorizations to provide an acceptable presumption that they have not 
introduced malicious logic.  
(2) Configuration control provides sufficient assurance that applications 
and the equipment are protected against the introduction of malicious 
logic prior to and during the operation of system applications. [NCSC 
1988] 
Several military systems are produced in such a controlled environment, 
employing trusted programmers. In the game, the player needs to buy software, and 
choose between different applications. Some of them are produced in such a closed 
environment. 
8. Intranet – Internet 
A network that connects components or networks of an organization, while 
disallowing access to components and users that do not belong to this organization is 
considered an Intranet. The network on board a battleship, connecting the components 
of the ship would be the ship’s Intranet. The military network, allowing access only to 
military components would be the Military Intranet. Examples are the Navy Marine 
Corps Intranet (NMCI) and the SIPRNET. 
For the purpose of the CyberCIEGE game, the network known as the World 
Wide Web, allowing access to anybody is considered the Internet. In the game, there 
are no means to keep attackers from accessing the Internet. However, the player can 
make choices to prevent attackers from accessing an Intranet. 
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9. Trojan Horse  
Hidden malicious code within software that offers a useful service to its user is 
referred to as a Trojan Horse. This malicious code performs additional tasks, hidden 
from and not intended by the user, i.e. “allowing the unauthorized collection, 
falsification, or destruction of information.” [CNSS No. 4009] Subversion is hidden 
code intended to undermine, or circumvent the protection mechanism of a system. A 
Trojan Horse differs from subversion in that it requires the cooperation of the victim, 
i.e. the victim has to run the application containing the Trojan Horse. Thus, the 
attacker cannot entirely choose the time of its activation. Because the application runs 
on behalf of the victim, the Trojan Horse is constrained by security controls imposed 
on the victim. Malicious code falling into the category of subversion is independent of 
a victim’s cooperation. It bypasses the security controls and is activated and 
deactivated by a trigger mechanism, allowing the attacker to determine the time of 
execution. While a Trojan Horse “executes in an application”, subversion “may 
execute within the OS,” [Irvine3 2004] An example of a Trojan Horse may be a small, 
popular game that a sailor, having access to the Internet downloads freely from the 
website of an attacker. While he is playing the game, malicious code within the game 
code is scanning the files on the system for sensitive information, e.g. communication 
codes, or is accessing and modifying the Electronic Warfare Signature Data Base 
(EWSDB), provided the user is connected to the same network, the CDS, and has the 
required clearance to access the assets. What if the ship’s CDS was connected to the 
Intranet and had no SK, i.e. no Mandatory Access Control (MAC)? Then every sailor 
able to introduce software to the Intranet could endanger the ship’s safety. 
An example for subversion would be malicious code within the OS of the 
Electronic Warfare System, which processes radar signals and has modify access to 
the EWSDB. An attacker could feed the system with a deliberately constructed radar 
signal that triggers the activation of the malicious code, which would then result in 
modification of crucial data. A trap door can also be seen as an instance of subversion. 
The CyberCIEGE game models both, subversion, and the notion of a Trojan 
Horse. Within the CyberCIEGE game, the player is provided the choice between 
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different types of component / OS combinations. Subversion is modeled, by providing 
operating systems with low integrity MAC enforcement mechanisms. These OSes 
have a high likelihood of attacks triggered by the game engine. Trojan Horses are 
contained in low integrity applications. Within the CyberCIEGE game, the player is 
provided the choice of installing a particular application on a component, by 
purchasing or selling software. The choice of the application’s integrity level directly 
influences the likelihood of a Trojan Horse attack. However, the game does not 
provide the granularity to model the player’s choice of running a particular 
application, to influence the activation of a Trojan Horse. 
10. Trap doors and Subversion 
The National Information Assurance Glossary [CNSS No. 4009] defines a trap 
door as a “Hidden software or hardware mechanism used to circumvent security 
controls.” The expression is synonymous with a back door. A penetrator seeking a 
means to gain access to a target system that is virtually undetectable and therefore not 
subject to patching, will try to install a trap door into the system. [Karger 1974] 
The difference between a trap door and subversion is, that a trap door is an 
instance of subversion. The trap door considers hidden code that allows an attacker to 
circumvent security controls, to gain access to a component. Subversion is the more 
abstract term, incorporating additional attack types, for example those attacks, where 
the malicious code is triggered to modify crucial data, without the need for an attacker 
to get access to the component. 
Three major classes of subversion can be distinguished, depending on the point 
of insertion into the software: 
a. Insertion into the software can be performed at the production facility. 
b. Insertion can be performed during software distribution, either as part of 
the initial distribution, or as updates. An attacker can intercept and modify 
the software during transport, or he can generate bogus copies containing 
malicious code and distribute them to customers. 
c. Insertion can be performed during installation and operation of a system. 
[Karger 1974] 
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All of these types of subversion are a threat to military systems. Due to budget 
constraints, the IT Officer of a battleship might need to buy low integrity software, 
thus potentially introducing subversion inserted at the production facility. Today, no 
major system is really free of flaws. Most military system will need frequent updates 
to meet changes in user and operational requirements. Both, regular and embedded 
systems frequently need technical assistance by company personnel, to perform 
initialization, updates or maintenance of the system or its components. The notion of 
subversion will be a major challenge in the scenario developed by this thesis. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
With the increasing number of computers used and interconnected in DOD, 
businesses and private homes, attacks on valuable, electronically stored assets have 
grown, too. Despite heightened security awareness, computer users and policy makers 
still tend to choose weak and insufficient security measures. This discrepancy is 
mainly affected by inefficient, primarily because it is boring, security training. 
CyberCIEGE provides hands-on experience and a tacit understanding about security 
implications, while being fun to play and consequently can overcome the problem of 
today’s security education. This thesis contributes to the game’s overall goal by 
creating a scenario that introduces the player into a virtual military-like facility and 
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III. SCENARIO GOALS 
This chapter discusses the group of intended players and the educational goals 
pursued by the thesis. 
 
A. INTENDED PLAYERS 
Trying to change the discrepancy between security awareness and failure to 
apply security principles in the daily life, there are four approaches differing in their 
time of impact. Educating personnel working as IT professionals, e.g. administrators, 
yields the fastest results. Training the future workforce certainly has a greater latency. 
Familiarizing decision makers and managers ranges in between the above margins. 
The first addressee is DOD personnel. However, cooperating with a commercial 
company and planning to bring the game to the open market, commercial and home 
users are also considered to be potential players. One should keep in mind, that DOD 
recruits many of its employees from universities and the civilian labor market. Thus, 
today’s commercial and home users might become future DOD personnel. Investing in 
the computer security education of this group will not only improve the global 
computer security situation, but will provide DOD with employees who already have a 
good basic understanding of computer security. This will reduce DOD’s employee 
training costs. 
1. IT Personnel 
IT personnel form the group that has the fastest means to apply security 
principals. They literally have their ‘hands on’ the devices that need to be 
implemented and configured in a way to properly enforce security principles. They are 
responsible for updating and patching critical systems, for configuring routers to block 
ports commonly known to be used by malicious software, for disallowing ftp, and for 
monitoring and performing audits on important network traffic. IT personnel have the 
means to set up their networks in a way to form secure cells that guard users from 
outside attacks, and also contain internal users or computers to launch attacks on 
others, using the Internet or connected networks. In other words, they can respond the 
fastest to the security principles learned by playing CyberCIEGE. 
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IT personnel can use CyberCIEGE as an educational tool to train new 
employees in either the IT department, or, if it complies with the company policy, any 
employee who is to be given access to company computers. Thus, they can generate a 
pool of employees who understand the basic security principles and therefore show 
more understanding for imposed security constraints; e.g. for the denial of installing 
privately owned software or the imposed password length and the need for frequent 
password changes. Employees trained by the game, will most likely have a better tacit 
understanding of security concepts and consequently reduce their error rate. 
IT personnel can use the game to create a virtual model of their network 
topology, serving several purposes: 
a. To train employees in a more focused fashion. 
b. To perform limited tests of basic principles of their current design. 
c. To plan and test changes before implementation. 
d. To present their plans and designs to management and illustrate cost 
benefit considerations6. 
2. Management 
The benefit of educating decision makers about computer security is that they 
realize the need for issuing a security policy and how their policy affects the company. 
The latency for results to show effects might be longer compared to the IT personnel, 
but once in place, they have a much higher potential to encourage or even enforce 
changes. 
Playing CyberCIEGE, managers can learn about the basic computer security 
principals, such that they can apply them in their interaction with devices. However, 
much more important is the opportunity to develop a tacit feeling for the implications 
security policies and imposed or neglected security measures have on a company’s 
assets and might have on its employees. Security measures come with a price, but the 
financial impact of neglecting them might far outweigh the investment.  
 
6 Note, the game is not a simulator. Only basic concepts can be illustrated and tested. 
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Consequently, knowing about security implications, managers and decision 
makers can develop better security plans, can make better decisions about funding of 
security measures, and will most likely be more successful in mobilizing their 
employees to follow their guidelines. 
3. Students 
Students form the long-term investment group for CyberCIEGE. Students 
eventually graduate and enter the labor market and will work for the DOD and 
companies most likely using IT systems as programmers, system developers, software 
engineers, administrators, evaluators, System Certifiers or Security Officers. Sooner or 
later, some might reach the management level. However, investing in a sound 
computer security education for this group will have the greatest impact in the long-
term perspective. 
The primary aim of the game is to provide educational facilities with a tool that 
can be used in laboratories to supplement computer security class education. 
[Thompson 2004] In laboratories students can deepen their understanding of the 
principles learned in class, by playing simple scenarios that synergize or build on each 
other. They can experiment with different policies and with different ways to 
implement such policies and are given a virtual world to develop and test, in a limited 
way, new ideas easily and with cost efficiency. Most important, however, is the 
opportunity to develop a tacit understanding of the underlying basics of computer 
security, about the benefits and drawbacks of policies, and about the advantages of 
different strategies to solve problems that have no single correct solution. These 
problems include the necessity to mediate between the ease of operational use of 
computer systems versus security confinements and benefits of security measures 
versus the cost to implement them. While devices and prices change with high 
frequency, the basic principles are steady. This type of knowledge will last much 
longer than any device-specific education. 
4. Instructors 
Instructors can use CyberCIEGE to assign work in a laboratory, as a 
supplement to their lectures. They can use the features of the game to evaluate the 
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progress of students and to analyze whether there are ideas and concepts that are 
difficult to grasp and need in-depth elaboration in class. 
Teachers might use the scenarios that come with the game or develop scenarios 
of their own, to illustrate focal points and emphasize special security implications. 
Learning basic computer security principles is vital for both the corporate 
world and DOD. In both, personnel responsible for managing computer technology 
and those using and working with computers need to be familiar with these principles. 
Although managers, administrators and normal users apply knowledge about computer 
security in different ways, they all can use the CyberCIEGE game to learn basic 
computer security principles. The game can be especially beneficial in the educational 
environment, to help instructors and students to achieve their goals and thus providing 
DOD and companies with employees skilled in computer security matters. 
 
B. EDUCATIONAL GOALS 
The previous section identified various groups as intended players. The groups 
apply knowledge of computer security principles in different ways. Managers use their 
knowledge to develop sound security policies; administrators and IT personnel, to 
implement the policy and build sound architectures; and employees use their 
understanding to apply security principles in their daily use of computers. The 
underlying basic principles of computer security, however, are common to all groups. 
The goal of the CyberCIEGE project is to teach all aspects of computer security. This 
paper focuses on integrity, as a contribution to the overall goal. This section analyzes 
the major risks to data integrity and outlines the four major educational concepts to be 
taught to the player. 
1. Trap door – The Low Integrity Software Problem  
The first and most obvious risk, in terms of data integrity, can be referred to as 
the trap door problem caused by low integrity software. (Figure 4) In this case, a user 
who needs to modify data of high integrity chooses to use software of low integrity. 
Low integrity software corresponds to off-the-shelf applications or operating systems, 
i.e., those types of software bought from a vendor and programmed by programmers 
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neither connected to, nor personally known by the user. In the case of military 
systems, these programmers are civilian personnel often working without any 
background checks or military clearance. Usually, no information is available to the 
prospective user about the principles applied during the software development process, 
nor is sch software reviewed or evaluated by a third party, for example in accordance 
with the Common Criteria, before installation. Thus, there is no reason to assume, and 
certainly no guarantee, that the software is flawless or free of malicious code. 
The resulting problem for the user is the risk that this software might indeed 
contain malicious code, such as a trap door, as an instance of a subversion mechanism. 
To trigger the trap door, an attacker can use any data sequence that is part of the 
admitted input domain of the system. This sequence serves as the signal recognized by 
the trap door to activate or deactivate the subversion mechanism, and e.g. grants the 
attacker root or operating system access to the system, allowing him to modify the 
high integrity data. If the subversion mechanism resides inside the module that verifies 
the input for validity, even a specially crafted data sequence that is not part of the 
admitted input set can serve as a trigger. This is because every data sequence 
submitted to the system needs to be read and evaluated prior to the decision to accept 
























Figure 4.   Low Integrity Software Problem 
 
In the case of a Trojan Horse, the malicious code runs every time the harboring 
application is executed. Running on behalf of the user, the Trojan Horse has the same 
privileges as the user and can therefore access and modify the high integrity data. 
This modification of data can damage financial or critical military or medical 
environments, if the user does not recognize it. Recognizing an unauthorized 
modification, however, is a difficult task. The trigger might be a certain combination 
of keystrokes, or a specific pattern of radar signals used in analyzing systems of 
modern war ships. In the case of low integrity software, since users do not analyze the 
source code of a program, a valid trigger might as well be a time bomb, in which the 
malicious code starts to execute at a pre-defined date. 
The major educational objective concerning this risk is for the player to realize 
that in order to protect high integrity assets he has to invest into high integrity 
software. Using low integrity software for either the OS, or the application accessing 
high integrity assets, poses a high risk to the asset’s integrity. 
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 2. Trap door – The High Integrity Software Problem  
The next risk to consider is the problem of evaluating software at a high level 
of assurance. To avoid the trap door and Trojan Horse problems discussed above, a 
user who needs to modify high integrity data decides to use high integrity software. 
(Figure 5) The user now faces the problem of determining the level of assurance with 
respect to the software’s ability to preserve the integrity of the data. Today, the 
solution to achieving assurance for off-the-shelf software is to have it evaluated by a 
third party. The process of evaluating even relatively simple applications, however, is 
very time consuming and expensive. Furthermore, today’s applications consist of very 
many ‘lines of code’ and are mostly of a structure that does not separate ‘security 
relevant’ from ‘other code’. Consider, for example, the operating systems of 
Microsoft, or applications like Word or Power Point. Most applications lack any 
specification of what ‘correct behavior’ actually is. If a detailed description of the 
required functionality is missing, the notion of having ‘no additional functionality’, 
and thus no malicious code, is meaningless. For such software an evaluation at EAL7 
is actually not possible. So there can be no guarantee that the application does not 























Figure 5.   High Integrity Software Problem  
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One problem is that a skilled attacker might be able to hide a Trojan Horse 
consisting of only a small amount of code such that it is not found even in the process 
of a thorough third party high assurance evaluation. This could be achieved, for 
example, by programming ‘dual use’ code as an integral part of application 
performance which, given an expected input, performs accurately, without any sign of 
a possible irregular behavior. Given, however a trigger that is a predefined input 
sequence which is a particular, possibly very rare subset of the admitted input domain, 
this code then maliciously modifies the high integrity data. As an example, consider 
the domain of admitted inputs to be any radar signal intercepted by a sensor and 
forwarded to an analyzing system. Let the trigger be a particular radar signal, of all 
radar signals possible. The extent of this input domain is well beyond the limits of 
exhaustive7 testing for current systems. Thus, by providing special data, the trigger, an 
attacker is able to control the behavior of even a thoroughly tested and evaluated 
application and alter the data that ought to be protected. For example, Anderson 
[Anderson 2002] demonstrated how a specially crafted corrupted UDP packet could be 
used to activate and deactivate a small artifice within an operating system supporting 
standard Network File Server code. 
An additional problem related to software evaluation is the “Turing machine” 
behavior of even moderately complex applications. This illustrates the problems that 
exist even in the case of closed environment software, which is produced by trusted 
programmers. In this case, it can be expected that the software is free of Trojan 
Horses. Again, even a third party evaluation cannot absolutely guarantee that the 
software will preserve the integrity of critical data. If the attacker is able to provide 
input data that is not a subset of the admitted input domain, the application might 
transit into an unpredictable state, essentially performing instructions scripted by the 




7 Testing of every possible case 
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The major educational objective concerning this risk is for the player to realize 
that  
a. Security has a price: It is costly to develop software to high security 
standards.  
b. Claims by vendors about security features and high integrity are not 
trustworthy, if a trusted party has not evaluated the software. 
c. Some software can be evaluated at high assurance levels. This is 
software that is simple enough to be analyzable. This software can be part of a high 
integrity system. Some applications are too complex, to be analyzable. Thus, it is not 
possible, to achieve high assurance evaluations on this software. In this case, a means 
to achieve high integrity software is to produce the software in a controlled 
environment, with trusted programmers. (Although some complex systems can be 
restructured to separate security-critical from non-security-critical functions, this does 
not help, if the non-security-critical functions must operate on the high integrity data) 
3. MAC Enforcement Mechanism  
A further problem, regarding integrity of stored data, is called the MAC 
enforcement mechanism attack. (Figure 6) This case illustrates the limitations of a 
MAC enforcement mechanism’s ability to protect high integrity data in a multilevel 
system. A system designed to handle multiple levels of security, i.e. both, high and 
low integrity data, uses a MAC enforcement mechanism to mediate the subjects’ 
request to access objects. The task of the MAC enforcement mechanism is to 
guarantee that only subjects with the required security label are permitted access to an 
object. Suppose the multilevel system incorporates two applications of different 
integrity. Application A1 is designated to operate on the high integrity data and is a 
high integrity product, free of malicious code, and most likely very expensive. 
Application A2 is assigned to operate on less critical, low integrity data and is off-the-
shelf software of unknown origin, most likely much less expensive. A1 is allowed 
modify access to the high integrity data, A2 is allowed read access only.  
If the MAC enforcement mechanism itself is not a product, designed to be 
evaluated at high levels of assurance, it will most likely have flaws. An attacker, who 
placed malicious code into A2, can exploit the flaws of the MAC enforcement 
mechanism and allow A2 write access to the high integrity data. Similarly, if an 
attacker was able to place malicious code inside the MAC enforcement mechanism, he 
would also be able to alter the high integrity data. 
Consider when the MAC enforcement mechanism is a security kernel (SK). It 
is trusted to be free of malicious code. In this case, it can reasonably be expected that 
the access control mechanism protecting the data cannot be circumvented by an 
application. However, there is still a risk to be addressed: the risk of improper 
implementation. If the low integrity software, A2 is assigned to operate on the high 
integrity data, A2 will be assigned the required permission, i.e., modify, and thus, the 
SK will grant A2 modify access to the data. In this case, an artifice inside A2 is able to 














Figure 6.   Attack On MAC Enforcement Mechanism 
 




a. It is important to choose a trusted MAC enforcement mechanism, thus a 
security kernel, to preserve the integrity of high integrity data in multilevel 
systems, which use software of various integrity levels. 
b. It is important to properly implement the RM concept. A SK will not be able to 
protect high integrity data if the security implementation assigns low integrity 
software to access the data. 
4. Social Engineering Attacks 
If a system is constructed, evaluated and implemented thoroughly, and 
considered secure with respect to technical computer security, there is still one more 
risk to be considered: the so called social engineering attack. (Figure 7) This attack 
addresses the issue of trust in operational personnel.  
In this case, the high integrity data is stored on a dedicated system, with no 
connectivity to external data, or networks. The application used to store and modify 
the data is a closed environment product of high assurance, posing no threat to data 
integrity. The only remaining variable available to an attacker is the personnel trusted 
to operate the critical data. The protection of the data depends solely on the integrity of 
the trusted user. 
The means an organization or the military uses to assess the level of 
trustworthiness of an employee is a thorough background check. The degree and 
accurateness of background checks is a question of financial effort, the timeframe for 
its performance, and the intended clearance level. An initial background check, 
however, will not suffice to guarantee high trustworthiness over an unlimited time 
frame. Periodic reassessments of those employees trusted with high security and 
integrity data are necessary to reduce the threat of subversion. 
The value the protected asset has for an attacker is of great influence. If it is 
high enough, he will most certainly devote sufficient energy and finances to find 
overwhelmingly tempting incentives customized to a trusted employee with access to 
this asset. The employee will then carry out the malicious action. In addition to 
background checks and periodic updates, to ensure the security of its assets, a 
company needs to have some means of auditing8 and of punishment that pose at least 
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Figure 7.   Social Engineering 
The major educational objective concerning this risk is for the player to realize 
that security measures include more than technical measures. It is vital, to include the 
notion of trustworthiness of personnel in security considerations for the system. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
The CyberCIEGE game primarily addresses current and future DOD personnel 
as the intended players. The scenario definition file (SDF) created by this thesis aims 
at educating four major groups: IT personnel, management, students, and instructors. 
The thesis concentrates on teaching four major educational goals, while focusing on 
integrity. Low integrity software is not the correct choice to protect high integrity data. 
Instead, high integrity software, produced in a controlled environment, with trusted 
programmers, is needed, or high assurance software, evaluated by a third party. To 
reduce the risk that high integrity data is maliciously modified in multilevel systems, a 
high assurance policy enforcement mechanism, such as a security kernel, is required. It 
is important to include the trustworthiness of personnel into security considerations. 
                                                 
8 Record system actions, to detect and document malicious actions 
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IV. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
This chapter introduces the reader to the virtual world of the scenario definition 
file (SDF) created for this analysis. It describes the setting, the policy, assets, and users 
of the SDF. It demonstrates how the educational goals of Chapter III are implemented, 
and that, indeed, this SDF generates a scenario that is simultaneously a playable game 
and educational tool. 
 
A. SETTING 
This section will familiarize the reader with the world the game player will 
immerse in while playing the scenario developed with this thesis. It contains a 
narrative describing the scenario’s educational goal, the setting and the environment 
the player will face within the game. The narrative will be attached to the game, 
serving both the casual player and an instructor, where the latter may be looking for 
specific educational goals. It provides a brief overview on what to expect, if choosing 
this scenario. This section also contains an introductory statement to the player that 
will be displayed on the scenario briefing-screen of the game. It will briefly inform the 
player of his role in the game play, the context, the main users and most important, the 
tasks he will have to fulfill in order to win the game. 
1. Narrative 
This scenario focuses on the integrity aspect of computer security. The primary 
concern is the protection of stored data against unintended, malicious modification 
within a networked military-like environment.  
The environment is the Combat Information Center (CIC) of a modern 
battleship. At its core is a suitable interconnection of IT components allowing the 
users to perform specific tasks, and an integral part of the ship’s fighting abilities. 
The player will assume the role of the ship’s IT Officer and will have to create 
the CIC’s IT topology from a blank environment. 
Company MODERN SHIPS INC. is an enterprise working in the ship building 
industry. Formerly mainly concerned with merchant ships, the recent tense market 
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situation has led the management to leave the traditional sector and offer a new idea. 
Their goal is to revolutionize the military ship building market: the concept is to build 
a sophisticated battleship without the time consuming DOD constraints and offer the 
finished modern product to the military much faster than via traditional acquisition 
channels. In this model, the military leases the ship and pays for the offered service. 
The company hires the crew, mostly former military personnel, and operates the ship. 
It is an outsourced ship. 
The first commissioned ship is called ARES. It exceeds the state of the art in 
battleship building. The ARES has brand new, highly sophisticated and automated 
sensors and effectors. To allow for a high degree of automation and the optimal use of 
the ship’s fighting power, the ARES will be provided with the most modern hardware 
and software to be integrated into a highly capable and automated, hence fast and 
efficient Combat System. It is the player’s responsibility, in the role of the ship’s IT 
Officer, to buy the actual components the ship’s crew needs to perform their tasks. 
Built by US-companies, owned by international stockholders, the ARES is 
rented as a mercenary to organizations, primarily the US military. The ARES’ goal is 
to succeed in every assigned mission, to quickly perform the preparatory missions with 
outstanding results and become ready for combat assignments, in order to increase the 
building company’s income and convince the stockholders to invest in more ships of 
that type. Therefore, the ARES will be assigned a sequence of missions, starting from 
low-level basic training, to patrol and combat missions. Thus, it will acquire the status 
‘combat ready’. This will enable the ARES to be assigned to increasingly complex and 
important missions. These missions mean increased revenues for the company and 
therefore better funding for the ship. 
In addition to the ship’s crew, one representative of the company is stationed 
aboard the ship all times. Since it is the first ship of its kind and type, the 
representative’s task is to:  
a. Assist in marketing the ship, i.e. schedule port visits, receptions, presentations 
and VIP demonstrations. 
b. Collect performance data of the ship’s systems and of the crew’s performance 
and produce a monthly Performance Report. 
The graphical setting of the game is the heart of the ship: the CIC including all 
ship steering capabilities. The CIC is subdivided into four rooms: the main CIC, the 
electronic warfare room (EW Room), the navigational room (Nav Room), and the 
company room. Each of these rooms is a zone with different users, assets and security 
needs. It is one of the player’s tasks, to set appropriate security settings for each zone. 
 
Com pany Room
M ain C ICEW  Room Nav Room
 
Figure 8.   Room / Zone Overview Of The Combat Information Center 
 
The player is the IT-Officer in charge of all IT. His first task is to buy 
components and software to allow the ship’s crew interaction with the ship’s systems, 
with each other and external sources (company), as necessary. Users need to operate 
on the assets they are assigned. They need to have access to these assets, they need to 
communicate, to pass messages and share information where required. The goal is to 
buy and connect components to build a Combat System (CS) that interacts with the 
surrounding environment at a suitable level of automation and creates a structure that 
allows the users to do their work, that is, to reach their goals, effectively and 
efficiently. The second task is to ensure security, by implementing the security policy. 
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The player’s task is to balance and mediate between the needs of the users and 
constraints derived from the security policy.  
His detailed tasks are to:  
• Read the information about users, assets and user goals, to determine the 
user’s needs and the protection needed by the assets. 
• Buy the required components, software, security personnel, and IT staff. 
• Assign the assets to the components and connect the components to 
networks, where necessary, to enable the users to reach their goals. 
• Set the appropriate security settings, to enforce the security policy. 
• Make adjustments as necessary, to keep the users happy and productive  
The scenario models a training mission that runs over a period of 60 days. The 
player has an initial budget at his disposal, and receives a monthly budget, to perform 
his tasks. The ship will gain or lose money, depending on the player’s choices. 
Unhappy or unproductive users will cause money loss, as well as security breaches. 
The player will win the scenario, if he does not lose all his money during the 60 days 
of game play. However, he will lose the game, if he cannot preserve the integrity of 
the high integrity assets. 
2. Introductory Statement To The Player: Player Brief 
The following statement is presented to the player at the start of the game: 
Welcome aboard the ARES. 
You have just been hired as IT-Officer for the first ship of the most modern 
class of battle ships. You are in charge of all IT on board this ship.  
Built by MODERN SHIPS INC., owned by international stockholders the 
ARES is rented as a mercenary to the US Navy. Her goal is to quickly become ready 
for combat assignments. This will increase the building company’s revenues and 
convince the stockholders to invest in more ships of this type. To achieve the first 
goal, the ARES needs to perform and succeed in a basic training mission. Achieving 
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the status ‘combat ready’ is a major step and will make the ARES available for 
complex, more challenging and better-paid missions. 
The ARES has a crew of six sailors employed by the company to operate the 
ship. They form a team in which everyone has a special task and hence, individual 
needs and demands for IT-support. The company keeps a representative aboard the 
ship, Alice. Her task is to assist in marketing the ship, and to collect performance data 
of the ship’s systems and crew to produce a monthly Performance Report. Alice too, 
will have specific demands for IT support. 
The ARES’ most valuable assets: Doctrines, Weapons, Electronic Warfare 
Signature, and Navigational data. It is crucial for the ship’s safety and the company’s 
financial well being, that the integrity of this data is preserved. 
Your task is to design and maintain the ship’s network, keeping the users 
productive while enforcing the ship’s security policy, the main focus being to ensure 
the integrity of the ship’s most valuable assets.  
You are given an initial budget, and you will receive a monthly budget to buy 
components, software, security personnel, and IT staff. 
Good Luck! (See the "Game" tab for additional help) 
 
B. POLICY 
Regarding the term ‘Policy’, this paper refers to a structure that comprises an 
institution’s or company’s management high-level guidelines concerning information 
or computer security, and several derived documents, providing more specific and 
task-tailored directives. These guidelines are to outline the overall goals of a company, 
its assets, its presumed risks and its objective, possibly also stating its ‘plan of attack’, 
to be achieved, implementing information security.  
This paper will use the definition of a security policy as provided by the 
encyclopedia to the CyberCIEGE game [Rivermind2 2004]: 
Computer systems (including networks of computers) can only be said 
to be “secure” with respect to some defined “information security 
policy”. 
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A security policy is a set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how 
an enterprise manages, protects, and distributes sensitive information. 
The sensitivity of information has historically been categorized in terms 
of three different policy goals: confidentiality (…), integrity (…), and 
availability (…). 
Security policies that protect the confidentiality or the integrity of 
information are further categorized by the basis for determining 
sensitivity of the information and the related constraints that should be 
placed on user access to the information. Three different categories of 
security policies are: 
Mandatory Access Control Policy 
Typically a management directive that identifies the sensitivities of 
information and the constraints placed on people who might have 
access to the information. Access is not granted based on the discretion 
of individual users. These "MAC" policies are both global and 
persistent. Example uses of MAC policies are protection of highly 
proprietary secrets from potential competitors and ensuring that only 
authorized accountants can alter specific critical financial data. 
Discretionary Access Control Policy 
Individual users or groups of users can own or otherwise control the 
access to information and potentially the dissemination of rights to 
grant access to other users. Access decisions are based on the discretion 
of users (often within the context of management mandates intended to 
constrain a user's decision to grant access based on a "need to know"). 
Application Security Policy 
Policies defined in terms of services or the intend behavior of an 
application. Examples include the desired behavior of web servers; the 
desire to detect and strip possibly malicious attachments from e-mail; 
and the use of firewalls to constrain inbound traffic to web requests. 
Additionally, "supporting policies" are often defined in conjunction 
with the above categories of policies. These supporting policies include 
"identification and authentication" (i.e., allowing the protection 
mechanisms to know who the user is), and "audit", (i.e., to enable 
individual accountability). 
A given enterprise can have a number of security policies having 
differing goals (e.g., availability, secrecy and integrity). And some 
policies can be more precisely defined than others. And, most 
importantly, the consequences of violating some policies are massively 
more severe than the consequences of violating other policies. 
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The scenario developed for this paper includes both, mandatory and 
discretionary policies. 
1. Mandatory Policy 
For this scenario, four secrecy and six integrity labels are defined for 
Mandatory Access Control. 
a. Secrecy Classification Levels 
The classification levels used for modeling secrecy in this scenario are 
SECRET (S), CONFIDENTIAL (C), OFFICIAL USE ONLY (OUO) and UNCLASS 
(U). 
(1) Secret (S) 
Secret is the classification level applied to information whose 
unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious 
damage to the national security. Examples include information whose 
unauthorized release could result in the disruption of foreign relations 
significantly affecting the national security; the significant impairment 
of a program or policy directly related to the national security; the 
disclosure of significant military plans or intelligence operations; and 
the disclosure of scientific or technological developments relating to 
national security. [DON 1999] 
The ARES operates for the US Navy to perform combat 
missions. Consequently, ARES possesses highly sensitive data, e.g. Electronic 
Warfare Signatures and a Weapon Database, important to the national security, 
classified as Secret. Only personnel cleared for Secret are allowed access to such 
information. 
Damage if compromised: This asset is worth US $200 to 
attackers, and US $6000 to the military. 
(2)  Confidential (C) 
“Confidential is the classification level applied to information whose 
unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage 
to the national security. Examples include information whose 
unauthorized release could result in disclosure of ground, air, and naval 
forces (e.g., force levels and force dispositions); or disclosure of 
performance characteristics, such as design, test, and production data of 
U.S. munitions and weapon systems.” [DON 1999] 
42 
The ARES is a battle ship built and owned by the MODERN 
SHIPS INC. consortium. It is assigned to the US Navy to perform combat missions. 
The ARES is therefore trusted to operate with US Navy data (e.g. Tactical Picture) 
with a classification level of Confidential. Only personnel cleared for Confidential are 
allowed access to such information. 
Damage if compromised: This asset is worth US $100 to 
attackers, and US $4500 to the military. 
(3)  Official Use Only (OUO). As a battle ship working for the 
US Navy, the ARES handles information about new technology, operational 
procedures or mission plans. This type of information might help adversaries to better 
understand US Navy maneuvers or operations and might help adversaries to catch up 
with technology or interfere with mission plans. Only personnel cleared for OUO are 
allowed access to such information. 
Damage if compromised: This asset is worth US $10 to 
attackers, and US $100 to the military. 
(4)  Unclassified (U). Most information handled on the ship is 
unclassified. Level Unclassified addresses information that, if disclosed to adversaries 
will have no negative effect to the ships safety, or the safety of the force. Everybody is 
allowed access to such information. 
Damage if compromised: None. 
b. Integrity Classification Levels 
The classification levels used for modeling integrity in this scenario are 
HIGH INTEGRITY (HI), HIGH INTEGRITY NAVIGATIONAL (HI Nav), HIGH 
INTEGRITY WEAPONS (HI WP), HIGH INTEGRITY ELECTRONIC WARFARE 
(HI EW), MEDIUM INTEGRITY (MI) and LOW INTEGRITY (LI). Nav, WP, and 
EW are used as compartments, indicating sensitivity of information of the same 
degree, HIGH, but separated. 
(1)  High Integrity (HI). Battleship ARES handles information 
vital to the ships’ and the forces’ safety, e.g. Doctrines and Weapon’s database, or 
Navigational data. It is very important for this data to be accurate and to be protected 
from tampering with. Only personnel cleared for HI shall be able to modify this type 
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of data. Note, however, that people without clearance for High Integrity Weapons are 
allowed to read this type of data. 
Damage if compromised: This asset is worth US $550 to 
attackers, and US $300,000 to the military. 
(2)  High Integrity Navigational (HI Nav). Navigational data, 
e.g. electronic maps, is vital to the ships’ safety. It is very important for this data to be 
accurate and to be protected from tampering. Only personnel cleared for HI Nav shall 
be able to modify this type of data. Note, however, that people without clearance for 
High Integrity Navigational are allowed to read this type of data. 
Damage if compromised: This asset is worth US $550 to 
attackers, and US $300,000 to the military. 
(3)  High Integrity Weapons (HI WP). Battleship ARES handles 
some information, mainly related to weapon systems, which is vital to the ships’ and 
the forces’ safety, e.g. Doctrines and Weapon’s database. It is very important for this 
data to be accurate and to be protected from tampering. Only personnel cleared for HI 
WP shall be able to modify this type of data. Note, however, that people without 
clearance for High Integrity Weapons are allowed to read this type of data. 
Damage if compromised: This asset is worth US $550 to 
attackers, and US $300,000 to the military. 
(4)  High Integrity Electronic Warfare (HI EW) Battleship 
ARES has an Electronic Warfare compartment that deals with sensitive information 
such as signatures of possible targets and countermeasures against incoming 
electronically assisted threats. It is very important for this data to be accurate and to be 
protected from tampering. Only personnel cleared for HI_EW shall be able to modify 
this type of data. Note, however, that people without clearance for High Integrity are 
allowed to read this type of data. 
Damage if compromised: This asset is worth US $550 to 
attackers, and US $300,000 to the military. 
(5)  Medium Integrity (MI). To ensure ships’ ability to 
participate and to properly perform in the assigned missions, the ARES needs access 
to highly accurate military and technical information, e.g. military mode GPS data. It 
is important that the integrity of this data is preserved. Only personnel cleared for 
Medium Integrity shall be able to modify this type of data. Note, however, that people 
without clearance for Medium Integrity are allowed to read this type of data. 
Damage if compromised: This asset is worth US $40 to 
attackers, and US $2500 to the military. 
(6)  Low Integrity (LI). Most of the data handled aboard ARES 
poses no threat to the ships’ or mission safety if some of it is found to be inaccurate. 
Flaws, e.g. in the Daily Status Report, will easily be detected or would have no 
harmful effect. There are no restrictions on modifications of this type of data with the 
exception of any discretionary policy that might be in place. 
Damage if compromised: None 
Following table provides an overview of the security labels used 
in the SDF. 
 





HI 3 None 500 300000
HI EW 3 1 550 300000
HI WP 3 2 550 300000
HI Nav 3 3 550 300000
MI 2 None 40 2500
LI 1 None 0 0
Secrecy
S 4 None 200 6000
C 3 None 100 4500
OUO 2 None 10 100
U 1 None 0 0  
Table 1. Security Labels 
 
2. Discretionary (DAC) Policy 
For this scenario, the users are separated into three different groups: 
COMPANY, SHIP and CO. Each group is handling information that is supposed to be 
accessed only by members of the specified group. However, members of each group 




Company MODERN SHIPS INC. keeps one representative, Alice, 
aboard the ship. Since it is the first ship of its kind and type, Alice’s task is to:  
1. Market the ship, i.e. schedule receptions, presentations and VIP 
demonstrations. 
2. Collect performance data of the ship’s systems and of the crew’s 
performance and produce a monthly Performance Report.  
The ship’s crew is paid and possibly exchanged on the basis of these 
reports, since the company is interested in proving to potential customers the 
outstanding performance of it’s new Weapon System. To avoid disruption of the 
crew’s performance by disgruntled employees, should they learn about their expected 
dismissal, the company does not want the ship’s crew to see this report. The report 
potentially also reveals natural shortcomings in some of the ship’s new systems, i.e. 
start up problems found in most new inventions. It is in the company’s interest that 
neither the ship’s crew, nor the customers, i.e. the US Navy, knows about those. 
They’d rather have the bugs fixed behind the scenes, than openly admitting problems 
and possibly reducing their share value. 
b. Ship 
Being a mercenary battle ship, the ARES handles information that 
might help competitors to catch up with its technology, copy efficient operational 
procedures, poach outstanding personnel or interfere with mission or business plans. 
Each time the ARES is part of a force, it has to share information with other ships of 
that force, e.g. the tactical picture and the ship’s status (amount of fuel, ammunition, 
supplies, operational status of the weapon systems, defects, etc). However, the ship’s 
commanding officer wants to limit and sanitize the information shared with the force, 
to make the ship’s performance look better. In addition, knowing about the 
performance-related paycheck and bonus system of the company, the ship’s crew does 
not want the management to find out about their shortcomings. Thus, only 
crewmembers shall have access labeled as SHIP. 
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c. Commanding Officer (CO) 
The commanding officer is responsible for all actions of the ship and 
within the ship. It is his job to form his crew into an efficient team ready to face all the 
challenges ahead. He is the mediator between the military necessities, the company’s 
wishes and the safety and well being of his crew. He ordered some data to be 
accessible only by the CO, i.e. some details of the next -possibly dangerous- mission, 
possible extensions of the ships deployment, planned crewmember exchanges. It is at 
his discretion, to disclose this data or parts of it at a suitable moment and to whom. Of 
course, any of this information is very tempting to the rest of the ship’s crew. 
Unintended disclosure might cause disturbance between team members and might lead 
to a drop in performance.  
 
C. ASSETS 
Assets constitute the core of any company. They can be secret formulas, 
military secrets, a customer database, and any information concerning a new product. 
Disclosure of this information would enable competitors to reduce their technology 
gap, thus causing financial losses to the inventors. However, often, disclosure of an 
asset is not a security risk, nor the main threat. In many cases, preserving the integrity 
of data is more vital. Customer banking accounts, a database containing the 
coordinates of military targets, the website representing a company, containing links to 
establish communication with customers, the software of medical, military and 
aviation equipment, all need to be protected against malicious or accidental 
modification. [Irvine1 2003] 
Proper protection against attacks on confidentiality and integrity of the high 
valuable assets is vital to succeed in the CyberCIEGE game - as it is in the real world. 
A detailed description of the role assets play in the CyberCIEGE game is provided in 
the game’s encyclopedia. 




1. Doctrines (DoC) 
Description: Doctrines are rules consisting of Triggers, Conditions and 
Actions, where each is formed out of one or several units concatenated by logical 
operators. Doctrines pre-set the ‘Operational Parameters’ of both, sensor and effector’s 
interfaces. They are programmed by a special team of experienced and trusted 
personnel and allow for a set of predefined parameter settings to adjust the ship’s 
Systems to pre-defined states, e.g. SAFE, NORMAL and CRITICAL. SAFE means all 
automated weapon engagements are blocked. NORMAL means that the ship is preset 
for routine peace operations, allowing automated engagements only on simulated foes. 
CRITICAL means the ships systems are prepared for automated weapon engagement. 
Other states can be generated at the commanding officer’s discretion. 
The Doctrines are of high relevance to the ship’s precise performance and to its 
safety. It is vital to preserve their integrity. If the data is corrupted, the system settings 
will be in an undefined state. This will most likely lead to misfire or automated 
engagement of any contact, possibly friendly or neutral. Any of these occurrences 
either endangers the ARES’ survival in combat or, due to friendly or neutral casualties, 
leads to dismissal of the ship from US Naval service. The resulting bad publicity 
would lead to financial bankruptcy of MODERN SHIPS INC. 
Although this singular set of rules applies to a specific equipment and 
environment, the data is classified as secret, because information about the ship’s 
weapon systems can be deduced from it. 
For the ARES, the Doctrines are its most valuable asset. 
Classification: S, HI WP 
Discretionary Controls: Ship. 
Asset Goals: Keep the Doctrines current and use them to set the weapon 
system to the most effective configuration for the current environment. To modify the 
asset, special software is required: Software of type DEFENSE 4T. Use the key "e", to 
look up details in the encyclopedia. 
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2. Weapon Parameter Data Base (WPDB) 
Description: The Weapon Parameter Data Base contains specific information 
about the ship’s weapons. This includes the ammunition needed, the weapon range, the 
pre-sets for ammunition and weapon-specific variables for certain shoot or drop 
conditions, e.g., the distance, at which a missile is supposed to activate its radar, the 
search window for the missile’s search sensors, the upper and lower search depth for a 
torpedo, and the minimal distance for a weapon to initialize it’s warhead. Another very 
important data set is the alignment variables of the weapon and fire control system. 
They ensure that the weapon really points towards the selected target.  
If this data is corrupted, weapons might be fired at a target different from the 
one selected, thus posing the threat of miss-fire, friendly fire or engaging a neutral 
contact. A flaw in the warhead initialization parameters might lead to an early 
explosion, threatening the ship’s safety. 
Any of these occurrences will be considered as total failure of the weapon 
system. The ARES will be decommissioned, and the company will face bankruptcy. 
Since adversaries might be able to better predict the ARES’ capabilities, only 
personnel cleared for secret shall have access to this information. 
Classification: S, HI WP 
Discretionary Controls: Ship 
Asset Goal: Keep the Weapon Parameter Data Base current. The data is used to 
update the ship’s weapon systems, to allow for fast and correct use of the weapons. To 
modify the asset, software of type DEFENSE RAT is required. Use the key "e", to 
look up details in the encyclopedia. 
3. Electronic Warfare Signatures (EWS) 
Description: Electronic Warfare Signatures are a digital fingerprint of 
electromagnetic emissions of a radar or communication system. EWS are used to 
classify and identify intercepted electromagnetic signatures. By comparing the 
intercepted data to the repository, the system can identify hostile ships and weapon 
systems. It can identify incoming hostile missiles and provide necessary data for 
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intercepting, e.g., height, flight profile, and speed. Should the EWS be modified, the 
ship could not properly identify a foe, and could not effectively counter incoming 
weapon systems. Serious damage or even total loss of the crew and the ship would be 
the consequence.  
To protect the EWS, only specially trained and cleared personnel are supposed 
to update the database.  
Classification: S, HI EW 
Discretionary Controls: Ship. 
Asset Goals: Keep the EWS current and use them to asses the type and threat 
of intercepted signals. To modify the asset, special software is required: software of 
type DEFENSE RAT. Use the key "e", to look up details in the encyclopedia. 
4. Daily Status Report (DSR) 
Description: The Daily Status Report (DSR) provides an overview of the 
current status of the ship's systems to the CO, e.g., the weapon, or propulsion systems. 
Each department has to contribute information concerning its systems. The DSR is a 
means for the CO to assess the current capabilities of the ship, based on system 
availability and status. The DSR is for official use only, and not to be disclosed to non-
ship members. 
Classification: OUO, LI 
Discretionary Controls: SHIP. 
Asset Goals:  
Write DSR: Add the current status of the department’s systems to the DSR, to 
keep the CO informed about the ship’s capabilities and problems. The information 
helps the CO make sound decisions. Software of type SPREADSHEET is required to 
perform the task. 
Read DSR: Read the current status of the ship’s systems to get information 
about the ship’s capabilities and problems. Software of type SPREADSHEET is 
required to perform the task. 
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5. Performance Report (PR) 
Description: One of the company representative’s tasks is to collect 
performance data of the ship’s systems and of the crew’s performance and produce a 
monthly Performance Report. The technical manager of the company utilizes this 
report to prioritize research, production and repairs. The marketing manager has 
developed a plan to influence the crew’s performance by incentives. Employees 
showing high performance will receive a higher salary and possibly bonus payments. 
Employees with a performance below a certain threshold over a specified period of 
time will face dismissal. 
The CO is allowed to read the report before submission. However, he must not 
alter the original contents. 
Classification: OUO, LI 
Discretionary Controls: COMPANY, CO 
Asset Goals: Monitor the performance of the ship's crew and weapon systems, 
and make a monthly report for the management. The technical and marketing 
managers need the report to prioritize research, and to streamline the incentives plan. 
To modify the asset, software of type WORD PROCESSOR is required. Use the key 
"e", to look up details in the encyclopedia.  
6. Frequency Plan (FP) 
Description: The ARES is rented by the US Navy and participates in exercises, 
maneuvers and missions consisting of several ships. To establish communication with 
these units several communication lines have to be established, using the frequencies 
assigned in the Frequency Plan (FP). The FP describes which frequency has to be used 
for all the ship’s communications, e.g., for the tactical communication on the Anti 
Submarine Warfare (AAW) line, during an AAW exercise, or for the ship-to-ship 
safety line during close formation exercises. 
Classification: OUO, LI 
Discretionary Controls: SHIP 
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Asset Goals: Keep the Frequency Plan current, so that the ship's crew is able 
to communicate with each other, the shore facilities and the other ships of the force. 
To modify the asset, software of type SPREADSHEET is required. Use the key "e", to 
look up details in the encyclopedia. 
7. Email (EM) 
Description: The email system on board the ARES is important to every sailor. 
As a morale measure, to ensure the sailors’ connectivity to news, their family and 
friends, at least one terminal has to be provided for email traffic. At a minimum they 
have to be fitted with Internet access, a mail messaging functionality (create, send and 
receive) and a picture viewer. It is the CO’s discretion to allow or interrupt access at 
certain times, according to the threat level in force.  
Classification: U, LI 
Discretionary Controls: Ship, COMPANY 
Asset Goals: Every person on board the ARES shall have access to the email 
system. It is, however, the CO’s discretion to restrict access at certain times, according 
to the threat level in force. To modify the asset, software of type EMAIL CLIENT is 
required. Use the key "e", to look up details in the encyclopedia. 
8. Internet Web Page (WP) 
Description: MODERN SHIPS INC. utilizes a webpage to present information 
about their products to potential customers. Unclassified information about the ARES’ 
structure, capabilities, past missions, pictures, port visits and times to visit the ship is 
posted. The Web Page is stored on a company server on shore. Alice, the company 
representative on board the ARES is keeping the information current. The information 
presented by the company is, in many cases quite idealized, especially concerning the 
workload and the payment structure. Some of the crewmembers do not like Alice and 
disagree. Given the chance, they would modify the page to get the representative into 
trouble. 
Classification: U, MI 
Discretionary Control: COMPANY 
52 
Asset Goals: Description: Create and update the company’s Web Page with 
current data about the ARES. To modify the asset, software of type Web Server is 
required. Use the key "e", to look up details in the encyclopedia. 
9. Mission Plan (MP) 
Description: The Mission Plan is created by the CO and describes the ship's 
current mission. It provides the relevant information for each department. This allows 
the crew to set their individual goals and identify their specific tasks. For example, the 
navigator can prepare the charts for the journey, the DOC Officer can prepare the 
appropriate Doctrines, and the Communications Officer can prepare the frequency 
plan. The information in the Mission Plan is to be accessed by the Ship's crew only. 
Classification: OUO, LI 
Discretionary Controls: CO 
Asset Goals:  
Create Mission Plan: Keep the relevant information in the Mission Plan 
current, so that the crew knows what lies ahead and can perform their tasks. To modify 
the asset, software of type WORD PROCESSOR is required. Use the key "e", to look 
up details in the encyclopedia. 
Read Mission Plan: Read and evaluate the information in the Mission Plan. 
You need to know what lies ahead, and derive and prepare your tasks. To read the 
asset, software of type WORD PROCESSOR is required. Use the key "e", to look up 
details in the encyclopedia. 
10. Tactical Picture (TP) 
Description: The Tactical Picture is the result of scanning the environment 
with sensors and processing this data, together with information gathered from other 
sources, e.g., intelligence, signature databases, etc., to obtain as much information 
about a contact as possible. The goal is to know about every asset in the area of 
interest, to be able to classify them as neutral, friend, or foe, and to track their 
movements. Modern systems should allow for sharing this information with other 
(friendly) units, if the ship is assigned to a task force, to generate more accurate 
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information by combining the capabilities of different sensors and to extend the area of 
coverage, exceeding the limited range of one’s own sensors. 
This information is important to allow for an accurate assessment of the 
situation, and for appropriate measures, e.g., to counter a threat. However, it is valid 
for a short time only, and it is constantly updated. Furthermore, transmission integrity 
is of minor concern, since the data exchange must be performed over secure 
(protected) lines only, to prevent adversaries from observing it. 
Classification: C, LI 
Discretionary Controls: SHIP 
Asset Goals:  
Create Tactical Picture: Create the Tactical Picture in the ARES' operational 
area. That is, obtain the necessary information about all contacts and classify them as 
neutral, friend, or foe. To modify the asset, software of type MANAGEMENT is 
required, and access to the Navigational Data is necessary. Use the key "e", to look up 
details in the encyclopedia. 
Read Tactical Picture: Read the Tactical Picture to obtain a current and 
accurate overview of the tactical situation in the ARES' operational area. Be informed 
about all contacts and their status: neutral, friend, or foe. To read the asset, software of 
type MANAGEMENT is required. Use the key "e", to look up details in the 
encyclopedia. 
11. Navigational Data (Nav Data) 
Description: Navigational Data comprises electronic maps, GPS position fixes, 
data about wind, weather, water drift, the ship’s position, course, speed, etc. This data 
is required to maneuver the ship correctly and to allow the CO to keep the ship safe. If 
the data is incorrect, the ship is in great danger to collide with obstacles, or run 
aground.  
Classification: OUO, HI Nav 
Discretionary Controls: SHIP 
Asset Goals: Use all your skills and navigational means (electronic maps, wind 
and weather data, GPS) to calculate ARES' accurate position, course, speed, and the 
surrounding conditions: wind, depth, obstacles, tide, etc. To modify this data, software 
of type DEFENSE 4T is required. Use the key "e", to look up details in the 
encyclopedia. 
The following table provides an overview of the assets used in the SDF. 






Y: yes; N: no; X: whichever
Electronic Warfare Signatures EWS HI EW S Ship YNNY
Doctrines DoC HI WP S Ship YNNY
Mission Plan MP LI OUO Ship YNNN
Daily Status Report DSR LI OUO Ship YYNN
Email EM LI OUO Ship YYYY
Web Page WP MI U PublicYNNN
Performance Report PR LI OUO Company YNXX
Alice YYXX
Weapon Parameter Database  WPDB HI WP S Ship YNNY
Frequency Plan FP LI OUO Uhura YYYY
Tactical Picture TP LI C Ship YYYY
Navigational Data Nav Data HI Nav OUO Ship YNNY  
Table 2. Overview Of Assets 
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The following table provides an overview of the asset goals used in the SDF. 
Name Assests AccessMode
(read/write/control/execute)
Y: yes; N: no; X: whichever
user Comments
Create Mission Plan Mission Plan YYXX James SoftwareType: 
WORD PROCESSOR 




Modify EWS EWS YYXX Wesley SoftwareType: 
DEFENSE 4T
Modify DoC DoC YYXX Leonard SoftwareType: 
DEFENSE 4T




Read DSR DSR YXXX James SoftwareType: 
SPREADSHEET
Modify Performance Report Performance Report  YYXX Alice SoftwareType:
WORD PROCESSOR 
Modify Weapon Database WPDB YYXX Leonard SoftwareType: 
DEFENSE RAT 
Modify Frequency Plan Frequency Plan YYXX Uhura SoftwareType: 
SPREADSHEET






Read Tactical Picture Tactical Picture YNXX James SoftwareType: 
MANAGEMENT
Modify Nav Data Navigational Data YYXX Pavel SoftwareType: 
DEFENSE 4T
Collect Reporting Data EWS YXXX Wesley SoftwareType: 
REPORTING
Update Web Page Web Page YYXX Alice Web Server
Modify EW Picture EW Picture YYXX Wesley SoftwareType: 
MANAGEMENT
Read Email Email YYXX all SoftwareType:
EMAIL CLIENT  
Table 3. Asset Goals 
 
D. USERS 
Each CyberCIEGE SDF has a set of users who work for the enterprise, on 
specific tasks and, by achieving their goals, earn money for the enterprise. The 
enterprise of this thesis’ SDF is the ARES. The users working in the virtual world of 
the ARES’ CIC, are subdivided into two groups; the ship’s crew and company 
representatives. This paragraph describes each of the SDF’s users. 
1. Ship’s Users 




a. Commanding Officer (CO) 
Name: James T Maury. 
Cleared to Secret, LI. 
Belongs to groups CO and SHIP.  
Description: James is the CO of the ARES. He is around 40 years old 
and has a wife, a son and a daughter. This ship is his third CO assignment. He held 
command on two modern frigates of the US Navy, before he was offered the chance to 
become CO on the ARES, the most modern ship available. James is an experienced 
sailor, knows Navy tactics and procedures and has proven to be a reliable and battle 
proof officer. As CO, James is responsible for all actions of the ship and within the 
ship. It is his job to form his crew into an efficient team ready to face all the challenges 
ahead. He is the mediator between military necessity, the company’s wishes and the 
safety and well being of his crew. James is a cheerful person; he loves new 
technology, although he is not well trained, nor skillful with IT tools. As a former 
Naval Officer, he knows that, for the military, security is very important. In order to 
keep his crew informed and focused on the tasks ahead, James needs to write the 
Mission Plan and update it on a regular basis. At all times, James needs to have read 
access to the Daily Status Report, to be current on the operational capabilities of his 
ship and to set priorities. Furthermore, James wants to read the company’s 
Performance Report, to monitor the information exchange with the company. On 
station, he must have access to the Tactical Picture, and the Navigational Data, to 
analyze the situation and prioritize actions. 
b. Warfare Coordinating Officer (WCO) 
Name: Joe Strain. 
Cleared to Confidential, LI. 
Belongs to group SHIP. 
Description: Joe is a well-educated and skillful Naval Officer. He has 
served on several Frigates and established his career in the Operations Department and 
worked on becoming a commanding officer. Joe is a cheerful, reliable person, and, 
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although moderately educated in IT technology, he is willing and able to learn quickly. 
Joe’s main responsibility is to compose the Tactical Picture, and keep it current. To 
prepare for the tasks ahead, he needs to frequently read the Mission Plan. Daily, he is 
required to write his portion of the Daily Status Report. 
c. Electronic Warfare (EW) Operator 
Name: Wesley Truxtum. 
Cleared to Confidential, HI EW. 
Belongs to group SHIP. 
Description: Wesley is leading the ARES’ electronic warfare. He uses 
the modern electronic warfare system to detect, analyze, classify electronic emissions 
within the ARES’ operational area and correlate them to detected tracks. In a combat 
situation, Wesley operates the active electronic countermeasures, e.g. generates false 
targets, or generates emissions that interfere with or possibly destroy the adversary’s 
sensors and weapon systems. Wesley is an excellent soldier, very reliable, and a hard 
worker. He gathered a lot of experience with the EW systems at previous assignments 
and has attended introductory IT courses. In addition to his main task, modifying the 
EW Signatures, Wesley needs to read the Mission Plan once a day and to prepare his 
department’s portion of the DSR. 
Later in the game, Wesley will be asked to collect Reporting Data of 
his system. 
d. Navigator 
Name: Pavel Codazzi. 
Cleared to Confidential, HI Nav 
Belongs to group SHIP. 
Description: Pavel is a cheerful person and hard worker. He has been 
well trained in the newest IT equipment of the ARES, as preparation of his role as the 
ship’s navigator. He displays lots of good will, he is very helpful and he tries hard to 
integrate into the ship’s crew. Unfortunately, the records from his previous command 
are missing as of today. Pavel’s main task aboard the ARES is to generate accurate 
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Navigational Data and keep it current at all times. The ship’s safety relies on this 
work. In addition to this task, Pavel needs to read the Mission Plan daily, and to 
prepare the portion of the DSR concerning the navigational system. 
e. Communications Operator (ComsOp) 
Name: Uhura Winthrop. 
Cleared to Classified, LI 
Belongs to group SHIP. 
Description: Uhura is a young, cheerful person, who recently entered 
the service. She had only one assignment before switching to ARES, which was as a 
communications operator, however, it was on an old ship, with older systems. Uhura 
knows all the naval communications procedures, but has not much experience with 
new IT equipment, yet. Uhura’s main task is to prepare the ship’s Frequency Plan and 
keep it current. To work effectively, she needs to read the Mission Plan at least once a 
day. Uhura is responsible for the portion of the DSR, concerning all communications 
equipment. 
f. Doctrines Operator (DocOp) 
Name: Leonard Boggs. 
Cleared to Secret, HI WP. 
Belongs to group SHIP. 
Description: Leonard is an experienced, reliable, and responsible 
soldier, who worked in the weapons department of several ships, before he was asked 
to join the ARES’ crew. He is always cheerful, friendly, and very helpful. Although he 
had no previous experience, with Doctrines, he is well trained in everything related to 
this new tool. However, he is only moderately trained in general IT equipment, but 
eager to learn. Leonard’s main task is to keep the Doctrines and the Weapon Database 
current. His two additional, but minor tasks are to read the Mission Plan, and to 




2. Company Representatives (CR) 
There is one company representative stationed permanently aboard the ARES. 
Company Representative (CR) 
Name: Alice Fitzroy. 
Cleared to Official Use Only, MI. 
Belongs to group COMPANY. 
Description: Alice is the company representative on board ARES. Alice 
is an intelligent, good looking and ambitious person, with detailed computer skills. She 
is very loyal to her company, enjoys being on the ARES and likes James, the CO. 
Alice understands the necessity of a security policy, however, she is quite a nosy 
person, and due to her task, she really would like to know in advance the ship’s plans, 
i.e. the Mission Plan. Alice’ primary task is to manage the marketing of the company’s 
newest and best product: the new ship, the ARES. She has to plan and schedule 
receptions in the harbors to be visited, perform presentations and invite VIP’s to 
demonstration tours. She is responsible for the production of the company’s Web Page 
about the ship and to keep the information current and accurate. Alice’ second task 
aboard the ARES is to prepare the Performance Report concerning the ship’s crew and 










The following table provides an overview of the users modeled in the 
SDF. 
Name Integrity Label Secrecy 
Label
Access to Assets
mode: r - read
m - modify
James T Maury LI S MP m
DSR r
TP r
Wesley Truxtum HI EW S EWS m
MPr
DSR r




Pawel Codazzi LI C NavData
MP
DSR
Uhura Winthrop LI C CC
MP
DSR
Joe Strain LI C TP m
MP r
DSR r
Alice Fitzroy MI OUO PR m
WP m  
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Table 4. Users 
 
3. Staff Members 
In addition to the users described above, the SDF provides several users as 
members of the IT and Security staff, whom the player can employ to assist the ship’s 
crew and the company representative. He can dismiss members of the staff, if he is not 
satisfied with their performance. 
These staff members are: 
a. Security 
John Cullen: John is a former Marine. He could not cope with the 
difficult tasks of his corps and decided to become a security guard instead He is very 
skilled and well trained. John is always in a good mood, however no information is 
available about his past. 
Winsome Adam: Winsome is a former Marine, well trained in weapons 
and Marshall Arts. She is very interested in IT technology and makes a perfect guard. 
Justin Talbot: Justin is a former Marine, with excellent training. He is 
the perfect guard. However, he is a little chauvinistic, but takes psychological training, 
to get better. 
Dave Wilson: Dave is a newly trained security guard, who only 
recently finished his training. He is said to be moderately skilled, but has a high 
potential for improvement. 
Debby Smith: Debby is well trained in weapons and Marshall Arts. She 
is very interested in IT technology and makes a perfect guard. 
The following table provides an overview of the security personnel. 
Name Trustworthiness InitialTraining Skill Happiness
Cost
US $
John Cullen 60 90 100 90 500
Winsome Adam 100 85 90 95 800
Justin Talbot 100 100 100 90 1000
Dave Wilson 90 70 80 90 650
Debby Smith 100 85 90 95 800  
Table 5. Security Guards 
 
b. IT Support 
JD Smith: JD is a CS graduate. He loves to work in the IT field and 
specialized in IT Security. He is very capable, effective and reliable. He is worth the 
high salary. 
George D. Jones: George is a former mathematician and IT guy without 
standards. He lost his job but seems to be willing to try again. Not much data is 
available about his past. 
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Naomi Joule: Naomi is computer geek. She is very friendly, always 
helpful and always has a smile on her lips. Naomi had some trouble with “computer 
crimes” before she joined the Navy. However, the Navy performed a thorough 
background check and cleared her for confidential. Naomi is very productive and 
certainly worth the salary. 
Buddy Martin: Buddy is a computer geek. He is trustworthy and well 
trained. Buddy is a friendly and good worker, who, however, gets distracted 
sometimes. 
Chloe Steele: Chloe is a computer geek. She is very friendly, always 
helpful and always has a smile on her lips. Chloe is very productive and certainly 
worth the salary. 
The following table provides an overview of the IT Staff. 
Name Trustworthiness InitialTraining Skill Happiness
Cost
US $
JD Smith 100 100 100 100 3000
George D. Jones 60 60 60 60 1000
Naomi Joule 80 80 99 90 2000
Buddy Martin 90 80 80 90 1500
Chloe Steele 80 80 99 90 2000  
Table 6. IT Staff 
 
The player has to accommodate the needs of eight users, seven soldiers, 
and one company representative. To assist these users in IT matters, he can employ IT 
staff, from a set of four persons with different skills. The player can choose among 
four security guards of different backgrounds and skills. 
 
E. IMPLEMENTATION OF EDUCATIONAL GOALS 
The above sections introduced the reader to the virtual world of the scenario 
definition file (SDF) created by this thesis. This section describes how the SDF 
implements the educational goals of Chapter III. Using the above description of assets 
and users, it answers the first research question of the thesis: can a scenario be 
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developed, such that it is simultaneously a playable game and educational tool, while 
illustrating integrity issues in a military-like networked environment? 
1. Software Integrity 
The major educational objectives concerning the first two educational goals are 
for the player to realize the impact of software integrity on the ability to preserve the 
integrity of assets, that claims of vendors tend to exaggerate the security features of 
their products and that high integrity software, produced in a controlled environment, 
with trusted programmers, or high assurance software, evaluated by a third party, is 
needed, to operate on high integrity data. 
To implement both educational goals, both high and low integrity assets, and 
an asset of medium integrity have been introduced. The ARES’ high integrity assets 
are the Electronic Warfare Signatures (EWS), the Doctrines (DoC), the Weapon 
Database (WPDB) and the Navigational Data (Nav Data). They are classified high 
integrity, with different compartments. The EWS are classified HI EW, the DoC and 
WPDB are classified HI WP and the Nav Data is classified HI Nav. The ship’s low 
integrity assets are the Mission Plan (MP), the Daily Status Report (DSR), Email, the 
Frequency Plan (FP), the Tactical Picture (TP), and the Electronic Warfare Picture 
(EWP). The company’s assets are the Performance Report (PR), classified low 
integrity, and the Web Page, classified medium integrity. 
The existence of assets of different integrity levels generates the requirement 
for the player to choose between software of different integrity, which is to be 
provided to the users, to operate on the assets. While low integrity software is 
sufficient and cost efficient, for use on low and medium integrity assets, high integrity 
software is needed for the high integrity assets.  
The asset goals related to each asset specify the type of software an user needs 
to access his assets. For example, to modify the EWS, the user Wesley, is required to 
have software of type DEFENSE 4T at his disposal. The assets DoC and Nav Data 
also require software of type DEFENSE 4T, whereas the asset WPDB requires 
software of type DEFENSE RAT. For each type of software, there are at least two 
different product choices. Application ‘Scare Crow Defense Systems 4T’ and ‘Skunk 
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Cellars 4T’ are both of type DEFENSE 4T. Thus, both are possible choices to provide 
user Wesley the software necessary to access his asset EWS, and thus, reach his goal 
to ‘Modify EWS’. However, there are differences between the applications. For 
example, ‘Scare Crow Defense Systems 4T’ has a price of US $10,000 and a moderate 
integrity value (400), while ‘Skunk Cellars 4T’ is more expensive, having a price of 
US $20,000, but it also is a high integrity product (900). Because the attacker value for 
assets classified HI EW is high (550), the cheaper software is not sufficient to preserve 
the integrity of the asset EWS. To access low integrity assets, low integrity 
applications are sufficient and are unlikely to cause serious malicious modifications, 
because the value of the asset to an attacker is also very low. For example, the asset 
MPL requires software of type WORD PROCESSOR. Applications of that type are 
‘WordSmyth’, price US $200 and integrity value 20, and ‘Word Triangle’, priced at 
US $20 with an integrity value of 80. Despite these differences, both applications will 
not cause malicious modification of the data, because the value of assets classified as 
low integrity is of no interest for an attacker. 
The description in the game’s ‘Software’ screen and encyclopedia is used to 
convey to the player, how much trust he can have into an application’s integrity. For 
example, the description provided in the game’s ‘Software’ screen for the application 
‘Molo Defense Systems RAT’ and ‘Scare Crow Defense Systems 4T’ is: “Pass all 
gov't tests for safety” [Rivermind2 2004]. This corresponds to low integrity values. 
The description offered for the applications ‘Skunk Cellars RAT’ and ‘Skunk Cellars 
4T’ is: “Built and maintained in a controlled environment, with trusted programmers.” 
[Rivermind2 2004] 
The player’s choice for the software offered to the user to operate on his assets 
and necessary to reach his goals, affects the chance to win the scenario. If the player 
chooses low integrity products for the ship’s high integrity assets, he will not be able 
to preserve the asset’s integrity for the required 60 days and he will lose. However, it 
is not possible for the player to buy applications of high integrity for all his users and 
assets. Therefore, playing this scenario and making the correct choices, the player will 
win the game and learn about the effect of software integrity to the security of high 
integrity assets.  
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2. MAC Enforcement Mechanism 
The major educational objective of the third educational goal described in 
Chapter III is to educate the player about MAC enforcement mechanisms: 
a. It is important to choose a trusted MAC enforcement mechanism that is 
architecturally positioned such that discretionary mechanisms cannot alter its 
enforcement functionality. Thus, to preserve the integrity of high integrity data in 
multilevel systems, which use software of various assurance levels. A security 
kernel is an appropriate mechanism. 
b. It is important to properly implement the RM concept. A security kernel will 
not be able to protect high integrity data if the security implementation assigns low 
assurance software to access the data. 
This educational goal is implemented by generating the need for an user to be 
given read access to a high integrity asset, while using an application of low integrity. 
This need leads to the requirement of a component that has a MAC enforcing 
mechanism, that enforces a mandatory security policy and allows the low integrity 
software read access, while denying it write access. For example, Wesley’s goal is to 
modify the EWS. He requires software of type DEFENSE 4T. To preserve the assets 
integrity, the player needs to buy the application ‘Skunk Cellars 4T’, which is of high 
integrity. A component with a high integrity OS suffices, a MAC enforcement 
mechanism in not necessary. 
Several days into the game, Wesley is assigned the task to collect reporting 
data of the EW system. To meet this task, he needs read access to the EWS with 
software of type ‘REPORTING’. Both applications of this type, ‘Scare Crow Defense 
Systems T&M’ and ‘Molo Defense T&M’, are of low software integrity (values 200 
and 300). The player can choose to buy Wesley one of the above applications, while 
still using a component without a MAC enforcement mechanism, or, the player can 
decide to buy a new component, which enforces a MAC policy. The first choice will 
lead to the asset’s modification and the player will loose the game, because the low 
integrity application will most certainly have malicious code that will have direct 
access to the EWS. If the player chooses to buy a component with a MAC 
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enforcement mechanism, he is given the choice between components. The components 
have different prices and MAC enforcement mechanisms of different assurance. To 
illustrate, that a high assurance MAC enforcement mechanism, a security kernel (SK) 
is required to preserve the integrity of high integrity data, the player will loose the 
game, if he chooses a component with a MAC enforcement mechanism of low 
assurance. For example, the correct choice to enable Wesley to meet his new goal 
would be to buy a component with a SK evaluated at EAL 6 or EAL7, e.g., buying a 
component with the OS ‘Green Shade Core’. Buying a component with the OS 
‘Trusted Populos Desktop’ that has a MAC enforcement mechanism of EAL 4 will not 
suffice to win the game. 
The need for the player to consider buying components with a MAC 
enforcement mechanism is further generated, by introducing the need to connect some 
components holding high integrity assets to a network of lower integrity. For example, 
the CO and Joe need to read the Navigational Data. Therefore, the player needs to 
connect Pavel’s, Joe’s and the CO’s component to a network. To protect the Nav Data 
from unauthorized modification, Pavel’s component needs to have a SK, because the 
CO and Jo are only cleared for low integrity. Similarly, Joe needs a component with a 
MAC enforcement mechanism, because he needs to access data of different sensitivity. 
He needs to read the Nav Data, classified LI OUO, while modifying the TP, classified 
LI C. Hence, a MAC enforcement mechanism of moderate assurance, EAL 4, is 
sufficient, because the asset TP is only of moderate value to an attacker. 
Playing this scenario, the player is encouraged to consider the value and nature 
of MAC enforcement mechanisms. The player learns that low assurance MAC 
enforcement mechanisms suffice for assets of low integrity, while a SK is vital, to 
protect high integrity assets. 
3. Social Engineering 
The major educational objective of the fourth educational goal described in 
Chapter III is to educate the player that security measures include more than technical 
means. It is vital, to include the notion of trustworthiness of personnel in security 
considerations for the system. 
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This educational goal is implemented by using two parameters that affect the 
integrity value the game engine calculates for a user: the parameters ‘Trustworthiness’ 
and ‘InitialBackGroundCheck’. One user is given a low trustworthiness value. Pavel, 
who is responsible for modifying the high integrity asset Nav Data, is given a 
trustworthiness value of 01. In addition, the value for the ‘InitialBackGroundCheck’ of 
the clearance label HI Nav is set to ‘medium’. The combination of these two values 
results in successful social engineering attacks on the user, who is lured by an attacker 
to maliciously modify his high integrity asset; in the case of Pavel and the Nav Data. 
These attacks occur even if the player has chosen correct component settings, as 
discussed above. The player will be able to prevent a social engineering attack from 
being successful, if he modifies the accessible parameter, the background check. The 
player needs to realize the low background check value (‘Back Check  Medium’ in the 
user screen) and to buy a high background check for the clearance level ‘HI Nav’ at 
the game’s security screen. 
During the game, the player has to monitor his financial resources, the 
happiness and productivity of his users and the needs of the users. The player’s 
choices concerning the components and software he buys for the users, and his 
decisions concerning the connectivity of the components, influences the way users can 
access their assets and achieve their goals, which influences the parameters user 
happiness and productivity. These parameters are also influenced by the security 
measures taken to implement the security policy and by the effectiveness of these 
measures. Very tight security measures, video cameras, for example, and the need to 
change to another zone to achieve an asset goal, have a negative impact on the user 
happiness. Incorrectly configured components lead to security problems, such as 
viruses, and result in monetary penalties, as well as in a reduction in user happiness. 
Some asset goals, e.g., ‘Collect Reporting Data’, are introduced later within the 
game’s playtime. They result in the need to reconsider the network design and security 
measures, chosen at game start and possibly in a modification of the previous player 
choices. 
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Additionally, ‘pop-up’ messages inform the player about new user needs, low 
user productivity and security breaches, generating a game-user interaction throughout 
the game and contributing to the playable aspect of the SDF. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
This thesis’ SDF creates a virtual world situated in the CIC of a modern battle 
ship. It generates users with different attributes and various clearance levels, belonging 
to two different groups (soldiers and civilians), and having different needs. Different 
assets and asset goals influence these needs. The assets are of various classification 
levels, the main focus being the integrity aspect of security, and generate the need for 
careful consideration about the hardware and software the player needs to purchase, 
and the network connections the player needs to establish, to enable the users to reach 
their goals and to be productive. Specific users, assets, and asset goals generate game-
play situations that can educate the player about basic integrity principles, 
implementing the thesis’ educational goals. These users, assets, and asset goals, in 
addition to other parameters, for example, user happiness, productivity, messages 
indicating new user needs, or attacks, allow for user-game interaction and constitute 
the SDF’s playability. 
Consequently, the thesis’ first research question can be answered. Yes, indeed, 
a scenario can be developed, such that it is simultaneously a playable game and 
educational tool, while illustrating integrity issues in a military-like networked 
environment. The SDF generated by this thesis is an example. 
The next chapter is concerned with answering the thesis’ second research 
question: Is it possible to validate that the CyberCIEGE game engine produces 
expected results from a specific scenario definition file? 
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 V. TESTING 
A. TEST STRATEGY 
The CyberCIEGE game models security concepts in IT environments. This 
thesis created a Scenario Definition File (SDF) to teach a player specific security 
topics while playing the game. Depending on the player’s choices in designing and 
implementing components and networks, security will be preserved or compromised. 
The specific educational goals of the game scenario developed by this thesis, 
are modeled and implemented within a complex SDF. However, the development 
process uses an incremental approach, starting with small, simple scenarios and 
stepwise adding more complexity. Along the development path, testing is used to 
verify that the intended goal can be modeled within the boundaries of the Scenario 
Format Template (SFT) and that the game engine properly simulates real world 
behavior. The testing phase concentrates on whether the game engine is able to accept 
the settings of the SDF and generate actions one would expect in the real world, such 
as virus attacks in the absence of anti-virus measures (i.e., AS software, scanning of 
attachments, prohibition of user-introduced software) or integrity attacks in the 
presence of low assurance software. 
The testing approach that seems to be the most suitable for this project is the 
Verification Validation and Accreditation (VV&A) [DMSO2 2003], more specifically, 
the face validation process9, as part of VV&A. Since the game is based on a 
behavioral model, rather than exact physics, testing has two inherent properties. First, 
it is nondeterministic in nature, i.e. the dependency between cause and effect is not a 
function. Rather, the result of a specific action or setting is expected to occur with a 
certain probability. Second, one cannot apply quantitative measures, but needs to focus 
on qualitative measures. 
 
9 Definition of face validation process by [DOD 1997]: The process of determining whether a 
model or simulation seems reasonable to people who are knowledgeable about the system under study, 
based on performance.  This process does not review the software code or logic, but rather reviews the 
inputs and outputs to ensure that they appear realistic or representative. 
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Reviewing DOD 5000.59-M [DOD 1997] and the current state of the game 
development process, which has no high level test plan and no VV&A process 
implementation in the development phase, face validation seems to be the best choice 
as a strategy for performing the above test goals. DOD 5000.59-M [DMSO1 2001] 
describes this process as being “useful mostly as a preliminary approach to validation 
in the early stages of development.” 
Using the face validation process and using the ‘SDF – developer’ as the 
subject matter expert, allows for several basic tests of the game engine and the 
developed SDF, while keeping testing costs and its time scale in proportion. This 
approach provides several test cases as building blocks to be incorporated in a high 
level, overall test strategy, allowing a continuation of the validation process and in-
depth follow-on testing. 
It is important to note, that the project is still in a very formative phase, causing 
several changes and adjustments to integral components. During the development of 
the SDF and during the testing phase, the game engine has been subject to software 
changes and fine-tuning. This has also been the case with the Scenario Template 
Format (SFT). This is reflected in the following chapter, as some of the test cases have 
been tested with more than one version of the game engine. 
 
B. TEST CASES 
This section describes some of the most significant test cases. The test cases 
follow a common three-fold structure. The first paragraph describes the scope of the 
test case, contains the name of the test-SDF and references the applied educational 
goal. The second paragraph depicts the expected results, while the observed results are 
the subject of the last paragraph. 
The test cases differ in magnitude and scope. Starting with small, simple 
scenarios, the test cases analyze single, isolated security concepts. They culminate in 
complex scenarios, combining several concepts into interrelated scenarios. 
The first test cases model security concepts derived from the four educational 
goals concerning integrity as described in Chapter II Section B of this document. It 
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uses very small and simple scenarios. They usually contain only one user and one 
asset. The intention is to isolate the educational goal from other effects that would be 
present in a real world scenario and verify that the game engine generates attacks 
specific to this simple environment. After the verification of the isolated educational 
goal, the scenario is gradually expanded to include more users, assets, components and 
secrecy and integrity issues. The final test case is the full scenario as described in 
Chapter IV.  
Test Cases 1 through 6 use the following general setting, and differ only in a 
small number of test parameters. 
Wesley is the only user modeled in the scenario. He is working on a single 
stand-alone component. Wesley’s goal is to modify the single asset, the EW 
Signatures, which is classified High Integrity EW (HI EW). The asset's secrecy label is 
CONFIDENTIAL (C). Wesley has the appropriate clearance (C, HI EW), is well 
trained and has a high trustworthiness. The Integrity value of label HI EW is high 
(1000), as is its attacker value (800). The Secrecy value of label C is low (100); its 
attacker value, however, is 0. The component resides in a walled office within an 
office area patrolled by a security guard and protected by a key lock. Due to the 
nondeterministic nature of the test subject and setting, the expectation is to experience 
at least one integrity attack and no attacks on secrecy, within 60 days. 
Changing to CyberCIEGE version March 11, several parameters of the game 
engine were modified. The attack frequency has been reduced and the importance and 
impact of physical security has been increased. To incorporate these changes, the 
SDF’s for the Test Cases 1 to 6 were adjusted. They include very high physical 
security settings to isolate the problems resulting from a trap door, which is contained 
in the low integrity software when purchased from a vendor, i.e., upon leaving the 
factory, while eliminating the risks resulting from malicious software introduced into 
the system from outside. Having only low physical security, an attacker could install 
new, flawed software, by gaining physical access to the component. To allow for easy 
detection of an attack event, conditions and triggers have been introduced and the 
Integrity value has been raised to 100,000. 
72 
For test case Reference Monitor Attack 2, “SoftwareType: Reporting” was 
added to the asset goal, replacing the requirement to use the software “Scare Crow 
Defense Systems T&M”. There are several instances of this software type. They differ 
only in their software integrity values. The reason for using the notion of 
“SoftwareType” instead of the specific software, is to test, whether the game engine 
recognizes that a specific software, “Scare Crow Defense Systems T&M”, as an 
instance of the type “Reporting”. Recognizing the software “Scare Crow Defense 
Systems T&M”, the game engine is expected to correctly determine the integrity of the 
software as low and therefore generate appropriate attacks. The names of software and 
the expressions for SDF settings are taken from [Rivermind1 2002]. 
Test Case 7 is concerned with user trustworthiness and uses a different setting. 
Wesley is the only user modeled in this scenario. He is working on the single stand-
alone component. Wesley’s goal is to modify the single asset, the EW Signatures, 
which are classified High Integrity EW (HI EW). The asset's secrecy label is 
CONFIDENTIAL (C). Wesley has the appropriate clearance (C, HI EW), is well 
trained, but has a low trustworthiness (10). The integrity value of the label HI EW is 
high (1000), as is its attacker value (800). The secrecy value of the label C is low 
(100); its attacker value is only 0. The component resides in a walled office, within an 
office area (CIC) patrolled by a security guard, and protected by a key lock.  
Test Cases 8 through 10 model an enhanced scenario, concerned with the 
notion of wiretaps. The scenarios share the following settings. Wesley and Leonard are 
the only users, each having his own office, component and asset. Both offices are 
modeled in a zone with high security settings, including a patrolling security guard, 
and key lock protection. However, a room separates them. It has very low security 
settings, and, thus, is accessible by everybody. 
Wesley is working in the EW room on a component carrying the asset he has to 
modify: the EW Signatures classified High Integrity EW (HI EW). The asset's secrecy 
label is CONFIDENTIAL (C). Leonard is working in the DoC Room on a component 
carrying the Doctrines (DoC), which he has to modify. The label of the DoC is High 
Integrity Weapons (HI WP) and C. Both users have the appropriate clearance to access 
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their specific assets; they are well trained and have a high trustworthiness (100). The 
Integrity value of label HI EW and HI WP is high (1000), as is its attacker value (800). 
The Secrecy value of label C is low (100); its attacker value is only 0. Both 
components are connected over a network. The configuration of the network permits 
the creation of three new scenarios, as modeled in Test Cases 8, 9, and 10. Each of the 
test cases, along with its expected and observed results, is described below. 
1. Trap Door - Low Integrity Software 
The name of the corresponding test-scenario SDF is “Case1.SDF”. (Appendix 
A1a) 
This test case models integrity risks caused by low integrity software, as part of 
the educational concept described in Chapter II, paragraph B, section one. High 
integrity data is accessed by low integrity software. Other effects, i.e. secrecy, were to 
be minimal. The test case models one user with a secrecy and integrity clearance 
appropriate for access to a single high integrity asset that resides on a stand-alone 
workstation. Both, the software used to access the asset and the component’s operating 
system (OS) software are low integrity. Furthermore, the OS does not enforce a MAC 
policy. 
a. Expected Results 
Based on the above configuration, it is expected that the game engine 
generates attacks aimed at contamination of the asset’s integrity, such as Trojan Horse 
attacks and will report that the asset has been corrupted. The Trojan Horses are 
expected to be part of malicious software within the low integrity software and OS. 
The key lock, the guard and the low secrecy attacker motive are expected to prevent 
attacks on secrecy. The expectation is to experience at least one integrity attack and no 
attacks on secrecy within 60 days.  
b. Experienced Results 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy, but several successful attacks on the asset’s integrity were observed. This 
behavior fully complies with the expected results. (Run March 4, 2004, using game 
version March 3; run March 11, 2004, using game version March 10) 
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Applying changes to the SDF, to make an attack more visible, yielded 
following results (“Case1.SDF” with changes to above: CM Strong, and 
IntegrityValue: 100,000): 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy, but one successful attack on the asset’s integrity. This behavior was as 
expected. (Run March 15, 2004, using game version March 11, run March 30, 2004, 
using game version March 24). 
2. Trap door – High Integrity Software 1  
The name of the corresponding SDF is “Case2a.SDF.” (Appendix A1b) 
This test case models integrity concepts illustrating the use of high integrity 
software, developed in an environment, practicing rigorous security engineering, as 
part of the educational concept described in Chapter II, paragraph B, section 2 of this 
paper. High integrity data is accessed by high integrity software. Other effects, i.e., 
attacks on secrecy were to be minimal. The test case models one user with a secrecy 
and integrity clearance appropriate for access to a single high integrity asset that 
resides on a stand-alone workstation. Both, the software used to access the asset and 
the component’s operating system (OS) are high integrity. However, the OS does not 
enforce a MAC policy. The component options used in this test case are: OS – GEOS 
(900) and software - Skunk Cellars RAT (900). 
a. Expected Results 
Based on the above configuration, it is expected that the game engine 
does not generate any attacks aimed at the asset’s integrity. Therefore no reports on 
asset corruption are anticipated. The software and the OS are expected to be free of 
Trojan Horses. Since there is only one high integrity application residing on the 
component, the lack of a SK is not expected to cause any integrity risks. This 
expectation, however, is valid only as long as the asset value is below a certain 
threshold. As known in the security domain, there is no such thing as 100% security, 
even in a closed environment. In the SDF this is modeled by a maximum attacker 
value of 800. Above this threshold, an attacker is expected to devote sufficient energy 
and finances in finding a way to access and corrupt the asset. 
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The expectation is to not observe any integrity attacks, or any attacks 
on secrecy within 60 days.  
b. Experienced Results 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy. However, the game engine failed in protecting the asset from modification. 
This behavior did not meet the expectations. (Run on March 4, 2004, using game 
version March 3). With CyberCIEGE game version March10 the asset remained 
protected for a period of 30 days. This complied fully with the expectations. (Run on 
March 11, 2004, using game version March 10). 
Applying changes to the SDF, to make an attack more visible, yields 
following results (“Case2a.SDF” with changes to: CM Strict, and IntegrityValue: 
 100,000): 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy. However, the game engine failed in protecting the asset from modification in 
the first run. This behavior did not meet the expectations. (Run on March 15, 2004, 
using game version March11). The second run yielded full compliance. The engine did 
not generate any successful attack on integrity within 60 days of game play. (Run on 
March 15, 2004, using game version March 11, run March 30, 2004, using game 
version March 24). 
3. Trap door – High Integrity Software 2 
The name of the SDF corresponding to this test-scenario is “Case2b.SDF.” 
(Appendix A1c) 
This test case models integrity risks caused by using both, low and high 
integrity software on the same component. The latter software is developed in an 
environment, practicing rigorous security engineering. This test case analyzes, whether 
the game engine is capable of generating behavior expected as part of the educational 
concept described in Chapter II, paragraph B, section 2. It models the risks faced by 
high integrity data in the presence of low and high integrity software, yet where a SK 
is absent. The test case models one user with a secrecy and integrity clearance 
appropriate for access to a single high integrity asset that resides on a stand-alone 
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workstation. Both, the software used to access the asset and the component’s operating 
system (OS) are of high integrity. However, the OS does not enforce a MAC policy 
and the component also incorporates low assurance software designated for other 
tasks. The component options used in this test case are: OS – GEOS (900); high 
integrity software - Skunk Cellars RAT (900); low integrity software - Scare Crow 
Defense Systems T&M (200). 
a. Expected Results 
Based on the above configuration, it is expected that the game engine 
generates attacks, aimed at the asset’s integrity, and reports about asset corruption.  
The high integrity, closed environment software and the OS are expected to be free of 
Trojan Horses. However, malicious code is expected in the low integrity applications. 
In lack of a SK it is expected that the high integrity asset will be accessed not only by 
the high integrity application designed and dedicated for modifying the asset, but also 
by the low integrity applications or a Trojan Horses within. 
The expectation is to experience at least one integrity attack and no 
attacks on secrecy within 60 days.  
b. Experienced Results 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy. The game engine successfully attacked and maliciously modified the asset. 
This behavior did not meet the expectations. (Run on March 4, 2004, using game 
version March 3) 
However, running the test again with CyberCIEGE game version 
March10, the game engine performed differently. Again, the game engine did not 
generate successful attacks on secrecy, which met the expectations. However, contrary 
to expectations, the game engine did not generate any attack on integrity within 30 
game-days. 
Applying changes to the SDF, to make an attack more visible, yielded 
following results (“Case2b.SDF” with changes to: CM Strict, and IntegrityValue: 
 100,000): 
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The game engine did not generate successful attacks on secrecy and did 
not generate successful attacks on integrity within 60 days of game play. This is fully 
compliant with the expectations. (Run on March 15, 2004, using game version March 
11, run March 30, 2004, using game version March 24). 
4. MAC Enforcement Mechanism 1 
The name of the SDF corresponding to this test-scenario is “Case3a.SDF.” 
(Appendix A1d) 
This test case models integrity risks caused by using both, low and high 
integrity software on the same component. The latter software is developed in an 
environment, practicing rigorous security engineering. This test case analyzes the 
game engine’s ability to generate behavior expected as part of the educational concept 
described in Chapter II, paragraph B, section 3. It models the risks faced by high 
integrity data in the presence of low and high integrity software, while using a security 
kernel (SK). The test case models one user with a secrecy and integrity clearance 
appropriate for access to a single high integrity asset that resides on a stand-alone 
workstation. The software used to access the asset is high integrity, and the 
component’s operating system (OS) is high assurance. However, the component also 
incorporates low integrity software allocated to other tasks. The OS enforces a MAC 
policy; thus a SK will mediate the access between the applications and the asset. The 
component options used in this test case are: OS – Green Shade Core (EAL 7); high 
integrity software - Skunk Cellars RAT (900); low integrity software - Scare Crow 
Defense Systems T&M (200). 
a. Expected Results 
Based on the above configuration, it is expected that the game engine 
does not generate any successful attacks aimed at the asset’s integrity. Therefore no 
reports on asset corruption are anticipated.  The high integrity software and OS are 
expected to be free of trap doors. The SK is expected to successfully grant the high 
integrity application designated for operating on the asset access, yet deny access to 
the low integrity application. 
The expectation is to not observe any integrity attacks and no attacks on 
secrecy within 60 days.  
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b. Experienced Results 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy. However, the game engine failed in protecting the asset from modification. 
This behavior does not meet the expectations. (Run on March 4, 2004, using game 
version March 3) 
Applying changes to the SDF, to make an attack more visible, yields 
following results (“Case3a.SDF” with changes to above: CM Strict, and 
IntegrityValue:  10000): 
The game engine did not generate successful attacks on secrecy and did 
not generate successful attacks on integrity within 60 days of game play. This is fully 
compliant with the expectations. (Run on March 15, 2004, using game version March 
11, run March 30, 2004, using game version March 24). 
5. MAC Enforcement Mechanism 2 
The name of the SDF corresponding to this test-scenario is “Case3b.SDF.” 
(Appendix A1e) 
This test case models integrity risks caused by using low integrity software on 
a component that incorporates a high assurance security kernel (EAL 7). The test case 
refers to the educational concept described in Chapter II, paragraph B, section 3. It 
illustrates the risks faced by high integrity data in the presence of low integrity 
software, while using a SK. The test case models one user with a secrecy and integrity 
clearance appropriate for access to a single high integrity asset that resides on a stand-
alone workstation. The software used to access the asset is of low integrity. The 
component’s OS has a SK which will mediate the access between the application and 
the asset. The component options used in this test case are: OS – Green Shade Core 
(MAC EAL 7); low integrity software - Scare Crow Defense Systems T&M (200). 
a. Expected Results 
Based on the above configuration, it is expected that the game engine 
generates successful attacks aimed at the asset’s integrity, displaying reports that the 
asset has been corrupted or modified. The SK is expected to perform correctly and to 
be free of malicious code. However, because the software dedicated to operate on the 
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asset is of low integrity, malicious code is expected within the application’s source 
code. The SK is expected to correctly grant the low integrity application access to the 
high integrity asset and thus, the malicious code is anticipated to perform unauthorized 
and unintended modification. 
The expectation is to experience at least one integrity attack and no 
attacks on secrecy within 60 days.  
b. Experienced Results 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy, but generated a successful attack on the asset’s integrity. This behavior fully 
met the expectations. (Run on March 4, 2004, using game version March 3) 
Applying changes to the SDF, to make an attack more visible, yields 
following results (“Case3b.SDF” with changes to: CM Strict, and IntegrityValue: 
 100,00): 
The game engine did not generate successful attacks on secrecy, or any 
successful attacks on integrity within 60 days of game play. This did not meet the 
expectations. (Run on March 15, 2004, using game version March 11). 
Using a modified game version, March 24, following results were 
observed: the game engine did not generate successful attacks on secrecy but did 
generate one successful attack on integrity within 60 days of game play. This is fully 
met the expectations (run March 30, 2004, using game version March 24) 
6. MAC Enforcement Mechanism 3 
The name of the SDF corresponding to this test-scenario is “Case3c.SDF.” 
(Appendix A1f) 
This test case models integrity risks caused by using both, low and high 
integrity software on a component that incorporates a low assurance MAC enforcing 
mechanism (EAL 4). This test case refers to the educational concepts described in 
Chapter II, paragraph B, section 3. It illustrates the risks faced by high integrity data in 
the presence of low integrity software, using a MAC enforcing mechanism. The test 
case models one user with a secrecy and integrity clearance appropriate for access to a 
single high integrity asset that resides on a stand-alone workstation. The software 
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assigned to access the asset is of high integrity. The component’s operating system 
(OS) is of moderate integrity, and an additional application is of low integrity. The OS 
incorporates a MAC enforcement mechanism of low assurance, which will mediate the 
access between the applications and the asset. The component options used in this test 
case are: OS – Trusted Populos Desktop (OS EAL 4, MAC EAL 4); high integrity 
software – Skunk Cellars RAT (900); low integrity software – WordSmyth. 
a. Expected Results 
Based on the above configuration, it is expected that the game engine 
generates several successful attacks aimed at the asset’s integrity. Therefore reports on 
asset corruption are anticipated.  The high integrity software is expected to be free of 
malicious code, such as trap doors. The low assurance MAC enforcing mechanism and 
the low integrity software, however, are expected to contain malicious code. The MAC 
enforcing mechanism is expected to successfully grant the high integrity application 
assigned to operate on the asset access to the high integrity asset. However, since the 
MAC enforcing mechanism is expected to contain malicious code, it is expected to fail 
to deny access to the asset by the low integrity application, which has no access 
permission. Thus, either the malicious code within the low integrity software, or the 
MAC enforcing mechanism itself are expected to modify the high integrity asset. 
The expectation is to observe at least one integrity attack and no 
secrecy attacks within 60 days.  
b. Experienced Results 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy, but generated a successful attack on the asset’s integrity. This behavior fully 
met the expectations. (Run on March 30, 2004, using game version March 24) 
7. Social Engineering Attack 
The name of the SDFs corresponding to this test-scenario are “Case4a.SDF.” 
and “Case4b.SDF”. (Appendix A1g) 
These test cases model integrity risks caused by low user integrity. Case4a 
models low integrity through a low user trustworthiness value (10), while Case4b uses 
a low value for the initial user background check (Low). These test cases refer to the 
educational concepts described in Chapter II, paragraph B, section 4. The test cases 
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model one user with a secrecy and integrity clearance appropriate for access to a single 
high integrity asset that resides on a stand-alone workstation. The software designated 
to access the asset and the component’s operating system (OS) are both of high 
integrity. The component options used in this test case are: OS – Green Shade Core 
(MAC EAL 7); high integrity software -Skunk Cellars RAT (900). 
a. Expected Results 
Based on the above configuration, it is expected that the game engine 
generates successful attacks aimed at the asset’s integrity. Therefore several reports 
about asset corruption are anticipated. The high integrity software and the OS are 
expected to be free of malicious code, such as trap doors. Although the component is 
configured safely, it is expected that an attacker will be successful in attacking the 
asset, by subverting Wesley, the only user, who has a very low integrity. 
The expectation is to observe three to five integrity attacks and a 
maximum of two attacks on secrecy within 10 days.  
b. Experienced Results 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy, but generated a successful attack on the asset’s integrity. This behavior fully 
met the expectations. (Run on March 8, 2004, using game version March 3) 
Applying changes to the SDF, to make an attack more visible, yields 
following results (Changes to: CM Strong, and IntegrityValue:  100,000): 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy, but generated several successful attacks on the asset’s integrity. This behavior 
fully met the expectations. (Run on March 15, 2004, using game version March 11, 
run on March 30, 2004, using game version March 24). 
8. Network 1 
The name of the SDF corresponding to this test-scenario is “CaseNW1a.sdf.” 
(Appendix A1h) 
This test case models integrity risks caused by using two highly protected 
components that reside in different highly protected, but not adjacent zones. These 
components are attached to a network that spans from zone to zone. The 
communication path between the two assets crosses a zone with very low security 
settings. Each component is directly connected to the same network. 
 
Attacker
Component 1 Component 2
Network 1
Zone 1 Zone 2
 
Figure 9.   Directly Connected Components 
 
a. Expected Results 
Based on the above configuration, it is expected that the game engine 
generates successful attacks aimed at the asset’s integrity. In particular, a wiretap 
attack is expected, since any attacker would have access to the low security zone, and, 
hence, would be able to access the network cable. 
The expectation is to experience at least one integrity attack and no 
secrecy attacks within 60 days.  
b. Experienced Results 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy, but generated a successful wiretap attack, compromising the asset’s integrity. 
This behavior fully met the expectations. (Run on March 30, 2004, using game version 
March 24) 
Using CyberCIEGE game version April4, the experienced result was 
different: the game engine did not generate wiretap attacks, which did not meet the 
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expectations. However, as expected, the game engine did not generate successful 
attacks on secrecy, or other attacks on integrity. 
9. Network 1 Router 
The name of the SDF corresponding to this test-scenario is 
“CaseNW1a_Router.sdf.” (Appendix A1i) 
This test case models integrity risks caused by using two highly protected 
components that reside in different highly protected, but not adjacent zones. These 
components are attached to a network that spans the zones. The communication path 
between the two assets crosses a zone with very low security settings. Each component 
is connected to a router, which is located in one of the protected zones. 
 
Figure 10.   Network With Router 
 
a. Expected Results 
Based on the above configuration, it is expected that the game engine 
generates successful attacks aimed at the asset’s integrity. In particular, a wiretap 
attack is expected, since any attacker has access to the low security zone, hence, is able 
to access the network cable. 
The expectation is to experience at least one integrity attack and no 
secrecy attacks within 60 days.  
Attacker
Component 1 Component 2
Network 1




b. Experienced Results 
As anticipated, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on 
secrecy, but generated a successful wiretap attack, compromising the asset’s integrity. 
This behavior fully met the expectations. (Run on March 30, 2004, using game version 
March 24) 
Using game version April4, the experienced result was different: the 
game engine did not generate wiretap attacks, which did not meet the expectations. 
However, as expected, the game engine did not generate successful attacks on secrecy, 
or other attacks on integrity. 
10. Network 2 
The name of the SDF corresponding to this test-scenario is “CaseNW1b.sdf.” 
(Appendix A1j) 
This test case models integrity risks caused by using two highly protected 
components that reside in different highly protected, but not adjacent zones. These 
components are attached to a network that spans from zone to zone. The 
communication path between the assets crosses a zone with very low security settings. 
To ensure security, each component is connected to an encryption device. The 
encryption devices are directly connected to each other, each residing in one of the 
protected zones. The communication paths from asset to encryption device run within 
the highly protected zones. Only the communication path between the encryption 
devices, carrying encrypted data, runs across the zone with very low security settings  
Attacker
Component 1 Component 2
Network 1







Figure 11.   Using A Link Encryptor 
 
a. Expected Results 
Based on the above configuration, it is expected that the game engine 
does not generate any successful attack aimed at the asset’s integrity. An attacker 
could physically insert a wiretap into the unprotected network portion; however, it is 
assumed that he cannot break the cipher. 
The expectation is to experience no integrity attack and no secrecy 
attacks within 60 days.  
b. Experienced Results 
As anticipated, the game engine neither generated successful attacks on 
secrecy, nor successful attacks on integrity. This behavior fully met the expectations. 
(Run on April 5, 2004, using game version March 24; run on April 6, 2004, using 





11. Playable Small Game 
The name of the SDF corresponding to this test-scenario is 
“Playable_04_05_03.sdf.” (Appendix A1k) 
This SDF offers a player the opportunity to learn about the effects of high 
integrity software on high integrity assets. 
The setting is a small military like facility, with two users, Wesley and 
Leonard. Wesley’s goal is to modify the asset Electronic Warfare Signatures (EWS). 
Leonard needs to modify the asset Doctrines (DoC). The player needs to buy a 
component for each user, and software of type DEFENSE RAT, so the users can meet 
their goals. In addition, the player needs to buy physical and procedural security 
measures, and to assign the assets to the purchased components. To win the game, the 
player needs to protect the assets from being corrupted for 30 days and to keep the 
average user productivity above 30%. 
One solution that allows the player to win is displayed in Appendix B1k. This 
solution assumes the player buys the high integrity software ‘Skunk Cellars RAT’, and 
removes the pre-installed low integrity software ‘Molo Defense Systems RAT’. 
Furthermore, it is assumed, that the player hires a security guard and buys security 
measures for the zones EW room and DoC room, such that the physical security value 
exceeds 430. The procedural security settings also need to be set to high security 
values, such as strong configuration management (CM), long password length, 
complex password character set, etc. 
One solution reflecting bad player choices, leading to losing the game, is 
displayed in Appendix A1k. The player is assumed to have bought a security guard 
and security measures such that the physical security value exceeds 430. However, due 
to, for example, financial considerations, the pre-installed low integrity software ‘Molo 
Defense Systems RAT’ has been used to allow the users to work on the high integrity 
assets. In this case, the game engine generates attacks on the assets, resulting in high 
financial losses, such that the game is lost.  
Following table provides an overview of the test cases, their main features and 
the result of the test run with game engine version May 27th, 2004. 
 
 GameVersion: May 27# Test # Name Description OS (MAC / OS) SW Expectation Result
1 c1 Case1.SDF 
LI SW 




2 c2a Case2a.SDF 
HI SW 




(900) no modification ok
3 c2b Case2b.SDF 
HI+LI SW 





Scare Crow Defense Systems  
T&M 
(200) modification ok
4 c3a Case3a.SDF 
SK,  HI + LI SW
(MAC EAL 7 / OS NA)
Green Shade Core
(EAL 7 / -)
Skunk Cellars RAT
(900)
Scare Crow Defense Systems  
T&M 
(200) no modification ok
5 c3b Case3b.SDF SK,  LI SW 
Green Shade Core
(EAL 7 / -)
Scare Crow Defense Systems  
T&M
(200) modification ok
6 c3c Case3c.SDF LA MAC,  HI +LI SW
Trusted Populos 
Desktop








(EAL 7 / -)
Skunk Cellars RAT
(900) modification ok




(EAL 7 / -)
Skunk Cellars RAT
(900) modification ok

















(900) no modification NOK
11 Playable_04_05_03.sdf 
bold: has access permission 
Testcases 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. CyberCIEGE Game Engine Improvements 
In the course of SDF development, and testing of the CyberCIEGE game 
engine, some game-play issues were experienced, which should be addressed in future 
updates of the game engine. The recommendations made in this section are based on 
tests using the CyberCIEGE game engine version May 27th, 2004. 
a. Mandatory Access Control Enforcing Mechanisms 
The CyberCIEGE game provides components with different Operating 
Systems (OS). Some of these OSes provide mandatory access control (MAC) 
enforcing mechanisms of different assurance levels. While the OSes with high 
assurance MAC enforcing mechanisms correctly protect high integrity data from 
modification on stand-alone components, the game engine generates successful attacks 
on the high integrity data, if these components are connected to a network with other 
components that have low assurance OSes. This behavior does not simulate real world 
behavior, where a high assurance MAC enforcing mechanism protects high integrity 
data independent of the nature of the other components connected to the same 
network. This game engine behavior needs to be corrected. 
b. Wiretap Attacks 
The CyberCIEGE game provides the means to connect components to 
networks. If the network architecture is such, that the communication path between 
components holding high integrity assets crosses a zone with low security settings, the 
game engine is supposed to generate wire tap attacks. The game engine version May 
27th, 2004, however, does not generate these attacks. This issue needs to be addressed 
in future game engine improvements, to better comply with real world behavior. 
c. Software 
The CyberCIEGE game allows the player to buy software for 
components, to accommodate user needs. This software, however, is bound to the 
component and is lost, if the player decides to sell the component. If a specific 
component needs to be replaced during game-play, the player is forced to pay for the 
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software a second time. To generate more realistic behavior, it is suggested to make 
the software a separate entity, possibly represented by an icon, such that the player can 
re-install the software on the component of his choice. 
d. Graphics 
The SDFs produced for this thesis model the combat information center 
(CIC) on board a modern battle ship. The only graphics-file available for the 
CyberCIEGE game, at completion of the thesis, that represents a military-like facility, 
is based on an office showing a shore facility. To better model the CIC environment of 
a battle ship, a modified graphics-file is recommended, which instead of displaying 
brick walls, and grass at the outer perimeter, models the interior of a battle ship. 
e. User Sensitivity 
The CyberCIEGE game, among other parameters, models user 
happiness. The value of the user happiness is influenced by the user’s sensitivity to 
security measures. For example, user happiness suffers in the presence of measures 
like patrolling guards, cameras, iris scanners, etc. While this sensitivity is important to 
teach the player that, sometimes, a careful balance is needed between security 
measures and a suitable working environment, the game engine needs to be adopted to 
distinguish between civilian and military users. Military computer users are used to 
work in high security zones and are less negatively affected by strict security 
measures, than their civilian counterparts. 
2.  Future Work 
The testing approach used for this project is the Verification Validation and 
Accreditation (VV&A) [DMSO2 2003], more specifically, the face validation process 
as part of VV&A. The testing concentrated on verifying, that the game engine properly 
simulates real world behavior. 
The next interesting step is to generate tests, to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
CyberCIEGE game in educating and training players. Results from such testing might 
lead to further improvements concerning the game engine or future SDFs. 
The first SDFs created for the CyberCIEGE project concentrated on specific 
aspects of computer security principles. Future SDFs may build on the basics and 
concentrate on more complex scenarios. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this thesis was to contribute to ongoing research concerning 
the project CyberCIEGE, conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School. “The purpose 
of the CyberCIEGE project is to create an Information Assurance (IA) 
teaching/learning laboratory.”[Irvine1 2003]  
This thesis asked if a Scenario Definition File (SDF) for the CyberCIEGE 
game could be developed, to educate and train players in Information Assurance on 
matters related to information integrity in a networking environment. The primary 
educational concern was the protection of stored data. Two SDFs were developed for 
teaching purposes. The SDFs demonstrate that, indeed, it is possible to create SDFs for 
the CyberCIEGE game engine to teach specifically about integrity issues. Future work 
is needed to evaluate the degree of effectiveness of this educational tool. 
A secondary goal was to test whether the CyberCIEGE game engine properly 
simulates real world behavior. Several SDFs were developed to demonstrate the game 
engine’s ability to simulate real world behavior for specific, isolated educational goals. 
This thesis evaluated many results and proposed changes to the game engine, which 
improved its behavior. The CyberCIEGE project is still in the development phase. 
Thus, the game engine is still being updated. Although not all of the experienced flaws 
were corrected at the time of the completion of this thesis, they will be considered for 
future game engine updates. 
As the number of computer users continues to grow, and attacks on assets 
stored on computer devices increase, effective education and training of computer 
users and policy makers in Information Assurance becomes more important. The 
CyberCIEGE game can be used to convey requisite facts and to generate tacit 
understanding of general computer security concepts to a broad audience, and thus, 
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APPENDIX A: SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT FILES (SDF) 
This Appendix includes the SDF’s of the main test cases described in this 
paper, the playable SDF and a version with possible player choices that lead to 
winning the game, and a version with bad player choices that lead to loosing the game. 
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APPENDIX B: WORKSPACE FILES 
The workspace file is specified in the SDF and determines the position of the 
user workspaces. The position is a coordinate consisting of two numbers. The first 
number describes the latitude, and the second number describes the longitude of the 
position at which the workspace is generated within the scenario. The first letter, N, S, 
E, or W, indicates in what direction the workspace faces. The last letter, A, or I 
indicate whether a workspace will be active (A) or inactive (I). If the workspace is 
inactive, it is not drawn in the graphical representation of the SDF. 
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